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A REASON TO DOUBT: THE SUPPRESSION
OF EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCE OF
INNOCENCE
BY CYNTHIA E. JONES∗
The government’s duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense
under Brady v. Maryland has become one of the most unenforced
constitutional mandates in criminal law. The intentional or bad faith
withholding of Brady evidence is by far the most egregious type of Brady
violation and has led to wrongful convictions, near executions, and other
miscarriages of justice. This Article suggests that two ramifications should
flow from intentional Brady violations. First, courts should have the power
to inform the jury of the government’s Brady misconduct by imposing a
specially crafted punitive jury instruction.
Unlike the ineffective
sanctioning scheme currently used to redress Brady violations, the
proposed “Brady Instruction” could serve as a powerful deterrent against
this virulent form of prosecutorial misconduct. Second, under wellestablished evidentiary principles, a litigant’s intentional suppression of
relevant evidence gives rise to an inference that the litigant’s case is weak
and that the litigant knew his case would not prevail if the evidence was
presented at trial. The government’s intentional Brady misconduct falls
within the scope of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference. Given
that the government always has the burden of proof in a criminal case,
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evidence that the government’s case is weak is relevant to whether the
government can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brady misconduct
evidence also meets all other requirements for admissibility under the rules
of evidence. As such, the blanket exclusion of this evidence could infringe
upon the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.

I. INTRODUCTION
In a nationally televised press conference, the Department of Justice
announced that a federal grand jury had returned a seven-count indictment
against Alaska Senator Theodore “Ted” Stevens.1 The eighty-four-year-old
Senator was charged with violating federal ethics laws by failing to disclose
thousands of dollars in gifts and services received from constituents.2 After
publicly announcing the charges, the Justice Department official thanked
the lawyers in the Public Integrity Section, the division of the Department
of Justice charged with investigating and prosecuting corruption by public
officials.3 Ironically, the Public Integrity Section lawyers who investigated
and prosecuted Stevens for nondisclosure of information would later face
investigation and possible prosecution for obstruction of justice due to their
own acts of nondisclosure of information.4 In fact, following the
prosecutors’ repeated acts of concealing, altering, and falsifying critical
evidence in the Stevens case, the trial judge rhetorically asked the
prosecutors, “How does the court have confidence that the Public Integrity
Section has public integrity?” 5
Once the government initiated the criminal case against Ted Stevens,
the landmark Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland6 mandated that
the trial prosecutors provide the defense with favorable information
collected by the government during the course of its investigation, including
information that either negated guilt or undermined the government’s case.
The same constitutional principles of due process that compel the disclosure
1
See DOJ Press Conference on Stevens’ Indictment (Fox News television broadcast July
29, 2008); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference with Acting
Assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich on Indictment of U.S. Senator 3 (July 29,
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/pin-stevens-pressconference
transcript.pdf.
2
Indictment, United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1), 2008
WL 284791.
3
DOJ Press Conference on Stevens’ Indictment, supra note 1.
4
Transcript of Motion Hearing at 4-5, 45-46, United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d
177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 374).
5
Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02stevens.html.
6
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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of Brady evidence likewise prohibit the government from securing a
conviction with false testimony or concealing the fact that such tainted
evidence has been introduced at trial.7
The crux of the criminal charges against Senator Stevens was that
VECO, an Alaska-based company, performed extensive renovations on a
home Stevens owned in Alaska.8 The government maintained that the free
labor, building supplies, and related gifts bestowed upon Stevens totaled
more than $100,000 over a seven-year period.9 The indictment alleged that
Stevens violated the criminal penalty provisions of the federal ethics law by
neither paying for these services nor reporting them as gifts when he filed
his annual financial disclosure statement.10 Though it did not charge
Stevens with accepting bribes, the indictment described Stevens’
relationship with VECO as a “scheme” to accept the free services while
VECO was soliciting the Senator’s help with obtaining federal grants and
seeking other federal government assistance with its foreign and domestic
business matters.11 In defense, Stevens maintained that he paid for the
renovation services and was unaware that he was not billed for the full cost.
Stevens argued that he never knowingly submitted false financial disclosure
statements.12
As the Stevens litigation progressed, the government violated nearly
every facet of the Brady doctrine. In fact, their Brady violations grew in
number and egregiousness throughout the trial.13 Specifically, the trial
judge found that the government “used business records that the
7

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
Indictment, supra note 2.
9
Id.
10
Specifically, Stevens was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006), which
penalizes any person “within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch
of the Government of the United States, [who] knowingly and willfully . . . makes any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation.” The statute was
enacted as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and requires every elected United
States Senator to file a financial disclosure form every year they are in office. The purpose
of the filing requirement is to monitor and deter conflicts of interest. Senators are required
to disclose their income, assets, gifts, financial interests, and liabilities from the previous
year, including gifts over $250 or $300, and liabilities in excess of $10,000. Indictment,
supra note 2.
11
Indictment, supra note 2.
12
Moreover, Stevens maintained that his wife directly oversaw the renovation project
and had taken out a second mortgage to pay over $160,000 to VECO for the renovations, an
amount they believed was the full cost of the services provided. See Neil A. Lewis, Closing
Arguments in Stevens Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A19, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/washington/22stevens.html; Stevens Says, ‘I am
innocent’ After Corruption Convictions, CNNPOLITICS.COM, Oct. 27, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/27/stevens.jurors/index.html.
13
Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 4-5.
8
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Government undeniably knew were false,” suppressed “critical grand jury
transcript[s] containing exculpatory information,” “affirmatively redacted”
exculpatory content from documents, and provided the defense with a series
of intentionally inaccurate document summaries.14 Moreover, when a
prosecution witness flown in from Alaska made unanticipated exculpatory
statements during a pretrial interview, the prosecutors secretly shipped him
back to Alaska before the defense could subpoena him.15
The Brady violations only intensified after Ted Stevens was found
guilty on all counts. Post-trial, the defense learned of a whistleblower
complaint filed by an FBI agent assigned to the Stevens case. When the
defense petitioned the court to order the government to disclose the facts of
the complaint, the prosecutors intentionally misrepresented to the court that
the FBI complaint was unrelated to the Stevens verdict. When the trial
judge later learned that the FBI complaint involved allegations that the
prosecutors had not turned over all evidence to Stevens’s defense team, the
court ordered the prosecutors to disclose all evidence related to the FBI
complaint to the defense. When prosecutors repeatedly failed to comply
with the court order, the trial judge held three prosecutors in contempt.16
Thereafter, a new team of prosecutors was assigned to the Stevens
case. The new prosecutors quickly uncovered and disclosed what the trial
judge called “the most shocking and serious Brady violations of all.”17 Bill
Allen, the Chief Executive Officer of VECO, was the star witness for the
prosecution. Most of the Brady violations during the Stevens case involved
information that either undermined Allen’s credibility or information from
Allen and others that affirmatively exculpated Senator Stevens. During the
trial, Bill Allen admitted that he received a letter from Stevens requesting a
bill for the renovation services. Allen testified, however, that he was
subsequently contacted by a Stevens emissary, Bill Persons, who indicated
that the Senator was only sending the letter to create a false record to
protect himself.18 This explosive revelation significantly bolstered the
government’s allegation that Stevens schemed to cover up his financial
windfall. The government never informed the defense that, during a pretrial
interview with the prosecutors, Allen stated that he did not recall having a

14

Id.
Senator Stevens’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment or For a Mistrial at 1-9, United States
v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-231).
16
See Minute Order, United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (on
file with author).
17
Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 6.
18
Actually, the testimony was that Allen should not worry about getting the letter
requesting the bill because “Ted is just covering his ass.” Transcript of Motion Hearing,
supra note 4, at 21.
15
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conversation with Bill Persons regarding Ted Stevens’s bill.19 Allen’s
inconsistent statement was memorialized in handwritten notes prepared by
the trial prosecutors.20 Despite knowing that Allen’s pretrial statement was
either powerful impeachment evidence or that Allen’s bombshell trial
testimony was perjury, the prosecutors withheld their handwritten notes
from the defense.
In the end, the Stevens case collapsed under the weight of the Brady
misconduct. Newly appointed Attorney General Eric Holder took the
extraordinary and virtually unprecedented step of requesting a
postconviction dismissal of all charges with prejudice.21 The Stevens
prosecution is significant, however, for three reasons. First, unlike most
criminal cases, when the Brady violations were discovered in Stevens, the
prosecutor’s office took affirmative steps to repair the damage to the
defendant and initiated its own internal investigation of the trial
prosecutors. In the overwhelming majority of cases, prosecutors face few,
if any, adverse consequences for Brady violations either within their offices
or from an outside entity with the power to address their misconduct.
The Stevens prosecution is also notable because of the actions of Judge
Emmet Sullivan who presided over the trial. While applauding the Justice
Department’s initiative in conducting an internal investigation of the Brady
misconduct, the judge also noted that “the events and allegations in this
case are too serious and too numerous to be left to an internal investigation
that has no outside accountability.”22 For this reason, Judge Sullivan
initiated criminal contempt proceedings against six of the Stevens
prosecutors “based on failures of those prosecutors to comply with the
Court’s numerous orders and potential obstruction of justice.”23
19
20
21

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 24-25.
Specifically, the Attorney General stated:

I have concluded that certain information should have been provided to the defense for use at
trial. In light of this conclusion, and in consideration of the totality of the circumstances of this
particular case, I have determined that it is in the interests of justice to dismiss the indictment and
not proceed with a new trial.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding
United States v. Theodore F. Stevens (Apr. 1, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2009/April/09-ag-288.html.
22
Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 46. Judge Sullivan also remarked: “In
nearly 25 years on the bench, I have never seen anything approaching the mishandling and
misconduct I have seen in this case.” James Oliphant, Prosecutors Now Target of Inquiry,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/08/nation/
na-stevens8.
23
Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 46. The court acted pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, which also authorized the court to appoint an independent
attorney to prosecute the case against the prosecutors. This rule of procedure states, in
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Commonly, when Brady violations are discovered—even when the
violations are intentional and blatant—trial judges focus on curing any
harm suffered by the defendant but fail to take punitive measures against
the offending prosecutor to deter future Brady violations.
Most significantly, the Stevens case is a sad testament to the relative
ease with which overzealous prosecutors can manipulate evidence and
finagle a guilty verdict in our American justice system. Because the
Stevens case was one of the most politically explosive cases of the decade,24
there was intense media coverage. Members of the press packed the
courtroom, and an even larger group of photographers and camera crews
were positioned outside the courthouse to provide daily reports on the trial.
The intense media coverage ensured that the trial would be more public
than the typical criminal case. Also, the Stevens case was prosecuted by a
team of veteran prosecutors from the premiere prosecution authority in the
country and defended by a top-notch team of experienced and respected
private defense attorneys.25 If multiple intentional Brady violations could
occur under these conditions, it is not difficult to understand how Brady
violations occur in run-of-the-mill criminal cases. As Judge Sullivan stated
upon dismissing the charges against Stevens,
[t]he fair administration of justice . . . should not depend on who represents the
[d]efendant, whether an FBI agent blows a whistle, a new administration, a new
attorney general[,] or a new trial team. The fair administration of justice depends on

relevant part: “Any person who commits criminal contempt may be punished for that
contempt after prosecution on notice. . . . The court must request that the contempt be
prosecuted by an attorney for the government, unless the interest of justice requires the
appointment of another attorney.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2).
24
Prior to being criminally charged, Stevens had served six terms in the U.S. Senate,
winning re-election five times. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=s000888. When the charges were
filed in July 2008, Stevens was in the middle of re-election to his seventh term in office. It
was widely believed that he would almost certainly be re-elected. Lewis, supra note 5.
Even though the guilty verdict was announced less than two weeks before the election, he
was only narrowly defeated by the democratic challenger, Mark Begich. William Yardley,
Senator Stevens Hanging by a Thread in Alaska as the Ballot Counting Continues, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at P17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/
06alaska.html. As was widely speculated prior to the election, the loss of the “reliably
Republican” Stevens seat had a far greater impact on the national political landscape because
the Democratic Party was poised to (and did) win a powerful sixty-seat majority in the
Senate, a feat that would not have been possible if Stevens had won re-election. Alaska Sen.
Ted Stevens Loses Re-Election Bid to Mark Begich, ABCNEWS.COM, Nov. 18, 2008,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/11/alaska-sen-ted.html.
25
Kim Eisler, Sen. Ted Stevens Hires Super-Lawyer Brendan Sullivan,
WASHINGTONIAN.COM,
July
1,
2007,
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/
capitalcomment/4457.html.
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the Government meeting its obligations to pursue convictions fairly and in accordance
26
with the Constitution.

Despite the nationwide epidemic of Brady violations and the
magnitude of injustice that results from such misconduct, the criminal
justice system has not developed effective reforms to provide a remedy for
defendants or appropriately sanction prosecutors for concealing evidence
favorable to the defense. Even though the disclosure duty is violated
regardless of whether the nondisclosure is negligent or intentional, the most
egregious Brady violations occur when prosecutors purposely withhold
information that they know is clearly and unquestionably favorable to the
defense. Shockingly, this level of willful misconduct—exemplified by the
blatant arrogance of the Stevens prosecutors—is generally not met with
harsh sanctions.
This Article presents two alternative proposals to remedy and deter
intentional Brady violations. First, pursuant to the broad discretionary
authority granted to courts to sanction Brady violations and other discovery
misconduct, trial judges should redress intentional Brady violations with a
strongly worded jury instruction. The proposed “Brady instruction” would
inform the jury that the government intentionally withheld evidence
favorable to the defense and would permit the jury to consider the impact of
the Brady misconduct as part of its deliberations. While legal scholars have
proposed the use of jury instructions to redress Brady violations, the
instruction proposed here is designed to be a punitive sanction that would
deter Brady violations by making the cost of Brady noncompliance too high
for errant prosecutors.
Alternatively, even if the trial judge does not elect to impose a Brady
instruction sanction, the defense is entitled to adduce facts at trial to show
that the government intentionally suppressed vital evidence favorable to the
defense. Under well-established evidentiary principles, the fact that a
litigant has purposely withheld or destroyed key evidence gives rise to the
inference that the litigant knows his case is weak and knows his cause will
not prevail if the adverse evidence is presented at trial. This “consciousness
of a weak case” inference falls under the broad umbrella of relevant
circumstantial evidence. Applied in the context of intentional Brady
violations, the defendant is entitled to show that the prosecutor—the person
in the best possible position to assess the merits of the government’s case—
was conscious of the weakness of the government’s case and purposely
withheld evidence that bolstered the defense or undermined the
26

Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 6-7. Stevens’s lead defense lawyer,
Brendan Sullivan, likewise lamented to the trial judge, “[A]s hard as you try to make it
fair[,] . . . we are no match for corrupt prosecutors if they want to hide information known
only to them or they want to present false testimony.” Id. at 30.
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government’s case. In a criminal case in which the government always has
the burden of proof, the “consciousness of a weak case” inference signals to
the jury that the government’s case is compromised and can provide the
jury with reasonable doubt. Just as criminal courts have traditionally
allowed the government to prove the defendant’s consciousness of guilt
with evidence that the defendant attempted to suppress or destroy
incriminating evidence, the government’s intentional Brady misconduct is
likewise admissible to prove the prosecutor’s “consciousness of a weak
case.” Accordingly, the trial court’s exclusion of Brady misconduct
evidence against the government is both counter to long-standing
evidentiary principles and constitutes an arbitrary denial of a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in defense
of criminal charges.
Part II of this Article discusses the foundation and scope of the Brady
doctrine and some of the complex litigation and reform issues that arise
under the current state of the law. Part III discusses the use of a Brady
instruction as an appropriate sanction for the government’s intentional
suppression of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Part IV
discusses the application of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference
created by the intentional withholding of Brady evidence. Part V applies
both the Brady instruction sanction and the “consciousness of a weak case”
inference to the case of United States v. Shelton.27
II: THE BRADY DOCTRINE
More than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court stated that the role of
the prosecution in the criminal justice system
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . [W]hile [the
prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
28
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

To that end, in Brady v. Maryland,29 the Court held that “suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process when
the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of good
faith or bad faith of the prosecutor.”30 The purpose of the Brady rule is to
ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial in which all relevant evidence
of guilt and innocence is presented to enable the fact-finder to reach a fair

27

28
29
30

983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009).
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87-88.
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and just verdict.31 The Brady doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the
trial prosecutor to investigate, preserve, and disclose favorable information
located in the prosecutor’s files, as well as information in the possession of
any member of the prosecution team.32 Recently, in Banks v. Dretke,33 the
Court reiterated that the “essential elements” of a Brady claim are
suppression of “favorable” and “material” evidence that results in prejudice
to the defense.
A. “FAVORABLE” EVIDENCE

The Brady disclosure duty is triggered by an initial determination that
the government has evidence that is “favorable” to the accused. The Court
has held that “favorable” evidence includes both exculpatory evidence that
negates guilt and impeaching evidence that undermines the government’s
case.34 Both exculpatory and impeachment evidence are treated equally
under the Brady doctrine. According to a recent national report, most state
and federal statutes and court rules designed to implement the Brady
disclosure duty fail to delineate the different types of information subject to
disclosure under Brady.35 As a result, the scope of the constitutional
disclosure duty has been developed in the volume of state and federal court
cases decided in the forty-five years since the Court’s decision in Brady.
1. Exculpatory Evidence
Evidence is deemed to be exculpatory if it tends to negate guilt,
diminish culpability, support an affirmative defense (duress, self-defense),36
31

Id.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1995).
33
540 U.S. 668, 669 (2004).
34
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1985).
35
LAURAL L. HOOPER, JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
TREATMENT OF BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE
COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES 12-14, 25-38 (2007) [hereinafter Brady Report],
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/bradyma2.pdf/$file/bradyma2.pdf.
But see DIST. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.2(A), available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/
general/pdf/combined01.pdf (providing a definition for “exculpatory evidence”); DIST. OF
KAN., GENERAL ORDER OF DISCOVERY AND SCHEDULING, available at
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/forms/index.php (listing specific categories of Brady evidence
subject to disclosure); TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N,
FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS 23-24 (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/
TaskForceonWrongfulConvictions/FinalWrongfulConvictionsReport.pdf (discussing various
categories of Brady evidence).
36
E.g., Arline v. State, 294 N.E.2d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (ordering new trial in selfdefense case where prosecution failed to disclose the weapon used by decedent during
altercation); Branch v. State, 469 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (finding error where
32
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or if the evidence could potentially reduce the severity of the sentence
imposed. The clearest example of exculpatory evidence is information
uncovered during the criminal investigation indicating that someone other
than the defendant committed the crime.37 Exculpatory evidence must be
disclosed even if the prosecutor does not find the information credible or
has other contradictory information.38 Exculpatory evidence includes thirdparty confessions, victim or complainant recantations, eyewitness
identifications of another person as the perpetrator, as well as descriptions
of the perpetrator that are inconsistent with the defendant’s appearance.39
Also included is forensic evidence that affirmatively excludes the defendant
as the culprit or fails to link the defendant to crime scene evidence
(including physical evidence such as DNA, fingerprints, or bite marks).40

defendant claimed self-defense to murder charges and gave uncorroborated testimony that
the knife-wielding decedent aggressively attacked him immediately before the fatal
encounter, prosecution suppressed evidence that a citizen gave police a knife purportedly
belonging to the decedent that was found at or near the crime scene, and prosecutor argued
in closing that there was no evidence to support the defense claim that the decedent was
armed); Ex Parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (mandating a new trial
where prosecution intentionally withheld a blood spatter expert’s report supporting the
defense’s theory that the victim committed suicide).
37
E.g., State v. Landano, 637 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (involving a
Brady violation where defendant charged with killing a police officer and prosecutor
concealed fingerprint and ballistics tests, which showed that the gun used to kill the police
officer was used in an earlier armed robbery committed by state’s chief witness).
38
See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (“Even if
the Assistant District Attorney ‘had valid reasons to consider this witness to be unreliable,
[he] should nonetheless have provided the defense with this important exculpatory
information which was clearly Brady material.’” (quoting People v. Robinson, 133 A.D.2d
859, 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987))); People v. Springer, 122 A.D.2d 87, 88 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986) (reversing the conviction and dismissing the indictment where prosecutor intentionally
destroyed surveillance videos relevant to the sole critical issue even though the prosecutor
claimed that he believed “the photographs showed nothing that would be of value in an
identification procedure”).
39
See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 71 A.D.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding a Brady
violation during prosecution of two African-American defendants where government
suppressed witness statements describing perpetrators as two white males); see also cases
cited infra note 44.
40
See, e.g., Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (finding a Brady
violation where prosecutor failed to timely disclose new blood test results revealing that the
blood sample used to match defendant’s DNA to the crime was inconsistent with defendant’s
blood); Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. 1991) (reversing capital murder conviction
where government knowingly suppressed exculpatory FBI forensic report which had
concluded that the hair sample used to connect the defendant to the victim was “not suitable
for significant comparison purposes”); see also Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Roy
Brown, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/425.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). At
trial, the government introduced testimony of an expert witness that a bite mark on the
victim’s body was “entirely consistent” with the defendant and suppressed the fact that
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The government is also required to disclose evidence regarding the
existence of other suspects who either have a modus operandi similar to the
charged offense or who had the motive, means, and opportunity to commit
the charged offense.41
2. Impeachment Evidence
Impeachment evidence encompasses a broad range of information that
would expose weaknesses in the government’s case or cast doubt on the
credibility of government witnesses. The Supreme Court has observed that
“[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle
factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a
defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”42 Impeachment evidence is
especially valuable in a case “when it impugns the testimony of a witness
who is critical to the prosecution’s case.”43 Impeachment evidence includes
any information regarding a witness’s prior convictions, biases, prejudices,
self-interests, or any motive to fabricate or curry favor with the government.
Impeachment evidence also consists of prior inconsistent statements of the
witness and any prior failure of the witness to identify the defendant.44 The

another expert had examined the bite mark before trial and excluded the defendant as the
source. Id.
41
E.g., Bloodsworth v. State, 512 A.2d 1056 (Md. 1986) (reversing a murder conviction
based on brutal rape and murder of small girl where government suppressed a police report
discussing another suspect who was found in the woods near the body, had a red spot of
blood on his shirt when interviewed by police, and who had the underwear of a small girl in
his car); State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999, 1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (reversing a
conviction based in part on the failure to disclose existence of another prime suspect with a
similar modus operandi who was seen at the scene of the crime on the night of the murder);
Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding that the government
did not reveal the existence of a person who had a motive to kill victim and had threatened to
kill victim shortly before her death).
42
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
43
Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Carriger v. Stewart, 132
F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting habeas relief in murder case where state failed to disclose
evidence that government’s star witness was known to be a “pathological liar” and a
“prolific career burglar”); Cook, 940 S.W.2d at 625 (finding a Brady violation where
government failed to disclose that witness was believed to be “mentally and emotionally
unstable” and “a pathological liar”).
44
E.g., Commonwealth v. Ellison, 379 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1978) (failing to disclose
initial pretrial statements of co-defendants, which did not name the defendant as one of the
participants in the crime and which contradicted their subsequent statements and trial
testimony); State v. Landano, 637 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (finding a
Brady violation where prosecutor suppressed evidence showing that the only eyewitness to
the crime specifically eliminated the defendant as the perpetrator during pretrial photo
identification procedure); Texas v. Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
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government must also disclose information that casts doubt on the ability of
the witness to accurately perceive, recall, or report the facts related to the
witness’s testimony, including mental instability, substance abuse, memory
loss, or any other physical or mental impairment.45
In addition, Brady impeachment evidence includes any positive or
negative inducements used to motivate a witness to testify on behalf of the
government. Inducements include promises, rewards, financial payments,
and benefits, as well as threats, intimidation, and other forms of coercion
used to secure testimony.46 Chief among government inducements are
offers of favorable treatment regarding the witness’s own criminal matters.
Commonly, the government must enter into plea deals, cooperation
agreements, or immunity agreements with witnesses in order to secure their
testimony against the defendant. The government violates Brady if the
government does not disclose the existence of these agreements. This
nondisclosure is exacerbated if the government allows these cooperating
witnesses to falsely testify that no agreement with the government exists.47
(suppressing crime victim’s pretrial statement that was diametrically opposed to her trial
testimony as well as her failure to identify defendant at police line-up).
45
E.g., Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82, 87 (4th Cir. 1991) (failing to disclose records of the
victim’s hypnosis, which were used to enhance the victim’s testimony); United States v.
Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-40 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (failing to disclose “severe
credibility problems” of key government witness, including a history of mental health and
substance abuse, as well the witness’ prior guilty plea to lying under oath in a case that led to
the arrest of an innocent man); Munson, 886 P.2d at 1003 (failing to reveal the fact that
testimony of one witness was hypnotically induced).
46
E.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 700 (2004) (vacating death sentence and
remanding case based in part on prosecution’s nondisclosure of financial payments,
cooperation agreements, and other impeachment evidence involving the state’s two chief
witnesses); Guerra v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075, 1078-80 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that
prosecutor intimidated and threatened three juvenile witnesses to identify the defendant as
the shooter); State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (ordering a new
trial where prosecution failed to disclose that a key witness implicated the defendant on
recorded interview only after being promised release from jail); Ex parte Brandley, 781
S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (finding that key government witnesses were
threatened, choked, and manhandled by law enforcement officers prior to falsely implicating
the defendant in the murder).
47
See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. 264; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); United States v.
Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 932-37 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that prosecutor allowed key government
witness to give unimpeached testimony that was either patently false or seriously misleading
and which severely undercut the defense); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th
Cir. 1993) (failing to disclose government informant status and cooperation agreement with
a key government witness); People v. Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1995) (finding error
where government witness who had agreement with government for reduced charges
committed perjury in denying the existence of any inducement to testify at trial and
prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony); People v. Perkins, 686 N.E.2d 663, 669 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997) (finding prosecution’s failure to correct government witness’ false testimony
that he received no favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony was intentional where
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In some cases, prosecutors have even affirmatively used the witness’s
perjured testimony regarding the nonexistence of an agreement to bolster
the credibility of the witness during closing arguments.48 In addition to
agreements, the Brady doctrine also mandates disclosure of both pending
criminal cases and prosecutable offenses committed by any witness and
known by the government.49 The existence of these unresolved criminal
cases could provide the witness with the expectation of favorable treatment
even in the absence of a formal agreement with the government.50
B. “MATERIAL” EVIDENCE

Non-disclosure of favorable evidence does not result in a Brady
violation, however, unless the defense can establish that the withheld
evidence was material or prejudicial to the defendant.51 In Kyles, the Court
held that the Brady materiality requirement is satisfied by a showing that
“the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”52 The
defense must also show that, in light of the evidence of guilt adduced by the
prosecution at trial, the withheld evidence was noncumulative, highly
probative evidence that could have had an impact on the determination of
guilt.53 The Court has stated that the defendant does not have to prove that
he would have been acquitted had the Brady evidence been presented at
trial but must show that, in the absence of the evidence, he did not receive a
fair trial “resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”54
“[o]ne of the prosecutors who tried this case participated in the earlier negotiations” with the
witness to secure testimony).
48
See, e.g., Banks, 540 U.S. at 700-02; Carriger, 132 F.3d at 470.
49
E.g., Landano, 637 A.2d at 1271 (“[The] State suppressed evidence that its principal
identification witness was under investigation for having ties with organized crime, and was
suspected of having engaged in loan sharking and money laundering, and further, that on the
very day his earlier tentative identification of defendant became positive, he was questioned
about whether he paid illegal gratuities to [murdered police officer] where defendant was
convicted of killing a police officer.”).
50
See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
51
The Court has made clear that the materiality determination is synonymous with the
prejudice analysis. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435-40 (1995); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1985).
52
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
53
E.g., United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no Brady
violation where suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnished an additional basis on
which to impeach a witness whose credibility had already been shown to be questionable);
United State v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that materiality standard is less
likely met where evidence of guilt is overwhelming).
54
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. If the defendant does not make this showing, reviewing courts
commonly rule that, although it was error for the prosecutor to suppress favorable evidence,
in light of the evidence of guilt adduced at trial, the suppressed evidence was not material.
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C. Intentional Brady Violations
From the inception of the Brady doctrine, the Court has consistently
stated that the intent of the prosecutor is not determinative of whether a
Brady violation has occurred. In Agurs, the Court stated:
[n]or do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability,
or the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence . . . of innocence is in his file, he
should be presumed to recognize its significance. . . . If the suppression of evidence
results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the
55
character of the prosecutor.

Though Brady violations can occur when a prosecutor accidentally or
negligently withholds favorable information, intent is not completely
irrelevant. In determining whether to impose sanctions for Brady
violations—particularly whether dismissal of the charges is warranted—
courts frequently rely on the presence or absence of evidence that the
government acted with purpose or in bad faith.
Intentional violations occur when the prosecutor fully understands the
Brady disclosure duty, is aware of the existence of favorable evidence in the
government’s possession, appreciates the exculpatory or impeachment
value of the evidence, but intentionally withholds the evidence to gain a
tactical advantage in the litigation. Too frequently, the intentional
withholding of Brady evidence has resulted in gross miscarriages of justice
in state and federal courts across the country. As in the case of Ted
Stevens, courts have found intentional Brady violations based on the blatant
and egregious conduct of prosecutors who knowingly used perjured
testimony at trial,56 deliberately shielded exculpatory evidence from
disclosure,57 purposely altered or falsified evidence,58 and knowingly
exploited the absence of the very evidence the state withheld.59

55

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).
E.g., Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The prosecutor’s actions
in this case are intolerable. Possessed of knowledge that destroyed her theory of the case . . .
she kept the facts secret . . . and then presented testimony in such a way as to suggest the
opposite of what she alone knew to be true.”); People v. Perkins, 686 N.E.2d 663, 669 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997); State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 620 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (“[T]he
prosecution made every effort to suppress the recordings. The prosecution knew if the
material contained on these tapes was conveyed to defense counsel . . . the credibility of [the
prosecution’s chief witness] would have been completely destroyed [and the defendant
would have been acquitted].”).
57
E.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
prosecutor “did everything he could to keep the defense from learning” of the existence and
nature of the government’s cooperation agreement with witness); State v. Landano, 637 A.2d
1270, 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding that “it is apparent that the State
deliberately concealed evidence” implicating the government’s two witnesses in the crime
the defendant was charged with committing).
56
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The impact of intentional Brady violations on the determination of
guilt or innocence in criminal cases is significant. One early study found
that Brady violations played a major role in the wrongful conviction of
more than one-third of the prisoners later exonerated by DNA evidence.60
Even in the absence of DNA evidence, postconviction reinvestigations of
old cases have also resulted in the exoneration of many prisoners wrongly
convicted in trials tainted by intentional Brady violations.61 Most
disturbing, however, is the undisputed fact that intentional Brady violations

58

E.g., United States v. Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-40 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (finding
that where the government “knowingly disguise[ed] the identity of a government witness and
deceptively” allowed the witness to testify under oath and give a false name “[t]he
conception and implementation of this plan was intentional and calculated to deprive the
defense of its right of confrontation. It almost succeeded.”); Price v. State Bar, 30 Cal. 3d
537 (Cal. 1982) (convicting defendant after prosecutor altered date and time of taxi cab
receipt to place defendant at the scene of the crime, destroyed original evidence supporting
the defendant’s alibi, and introduced the false evidence at trial).
59
E.g., Arline v. State, 294 N.E.2d 840, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that despite
pretrial receipt of knife used by decedent to cut defendant during fatal encounter in selfdefense case, prosecutor “exaggerated [the knife’s] absence in evidence,” strongly
suggesting to the jury that the knife did not exist); Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding that prosecutors “engaged in a deliberate course of conduct”
to keep exculpatory evidence away from defense counsel).
60
In a study of the first seventy-four DNA-based exonerations, the Innocence Project
found that the initial wrongful conviction was caused, in part, by Brady violations.
Specifically, the study found that 37% of the cases involved the suppression of exculpatory
evidence, 25% involved the knowing use of false testimony, and 11% involved the
undisclosed use of coerced witness testimony. BARRY SCHECK, JIM DWYER & PETER
NEUFELD, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (1st ed. 2001); Innocence Project, Understand the Causes,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (follow the Forensic Science Misconduct and
Government Misconduct hyperlinks) (last visited Feb. 2, 2010); see also CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS 91-100
(2003) [hereinafter HARMFUL ERROR] (citing twenty-eight cases where prosecutorial
misconduct, most commonly Brady violations, significantly contributed to the wrongful
conviction of people who were later exonerated).
61
E.g., Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 548 (D.N.J. 1985) (granting habeas relief in
the case of famed boxer Rubin “Hurricane” Carter where the prosecution purposely
misrepresented the results of a polygraph test given to its key witness in order to manipulate
the witness into abandoning his recantation and giving the inculpatory testimony at the retrial that placed defendants at the scene of the crime); People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977,
982-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding that defense was denied powerful impeachment
evidence in child sexual assault trial where the government argued that the child’s extensive
knowledge of sexual activity stemmed from sexual abuse by defendant but suppressed
documents showing that child had an unusually advanced knowledge and sophistication
regarding sexual matters well before the alleged sexual assault); Ex parte Adams, 768
S.W.2d 281, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (finding in murder case that “the State was guilty
of suppressing evidence favorable to the accused, deceiving the trial court during [the] trial,
and knowingly using perjured testimony”).
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have resulted in near executions in numerous death penalty cases.62 In one
case, after twelve years on death row, a man came within fifteen hours of
execution before being granted habeas relief.63 More recently, Delma
Banks was strapped to a gurney in the Texas death chamber and was within
ten minutes of execution when the Supreme Court granted a stay of
execution and ruled that he was entitled to habeas relief based on Brady
violations that infected his trial.64 There have been numerous other
reversals of capital convictions based on intentional Brady violations.65 In
the overwhelming majority of capital murder cases, once Brady violations
are exposed, the government opts not to retry the case,66 or the formerly
62

E.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 5 (2000), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
instructionalservices/liebman/liebman_final.pdf (documenting Brady violations in 16% to
19% of capital cases); DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G.
Cassell eds., 2004) (finding that 35 out of 350 wrongful convictions based on wrongful
suppression of evidence); Ames Alexander & Liz Chandler, Errors, Inequities Often Cloud
Capital Cases in the Carolinas, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 10, 2000, at 1A (stating that in
“North Carolina since 1977[,] . . . [c]ourts have overturned more than 25 death sentences,
many based on findings that prosecutors hid evidence, made improper arguments, or broke
other rules”).
63
Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1986) (vacating 1974 capital
murder convictions upon finding that the prosecutor failed to step forward when the only
witness at trial to place the defendant at the scene of the crime and the only witness to testify
to incriminating admissions by the defendant falsely testified that he had not received
immunity from the government in exchange for his testimony).
64
See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 133 (2007); see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
65
E.g., State v. Moore, 969 So. 2d 169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (vacating death sentence
and ordering a new trial due to nondisclosure of exculpatory information in FBI reports);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 322-25 (Pa. 1992) (reversing death sentence upon
finding that the government’s “intentional suppression” of extremely “exculpatory physical
evidence” while arguing in favor of the death sentence on direct appeal “constitute[s]
prosecutorial misconduct such as violat[ing] all principles of justice and fairness”).
66
See Guerra v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075, 1078-80 (5th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Wainwright,
785 F.2d 1457, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1986); Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995); Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 252-53 (Ga. 1991); Taylor Bright, Guilty Until
Proven Innocent?, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, Dec. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.patrickcrusade.org/execution_2_5.htm (reporting that after court ordered a new
trial, District Attorney decided not to prosecute former condemned prisoner); Jingle Davis &
Mark Curriden, Condemned Man Is Freed After Repeal, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 7, 1991,
at E2 (reporting that prosecutors decided they could not re-prosecute Gary Zant following
the reversal of his capital murder conviction for the rape and murder of a six-year-old girl);
Sydney P. Freedberg, Freed from Death Row, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4, 1999, at 8A,
available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/70499/State/yesangry.shtml (stating that after
twelve years in prison, on remand, the prosecutor’s office opted not to retry the case against
Joseph Greene Brown and the former death row inmate was released after over five years on
death row); Mexican Long Held in Texas Murder Wins His Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1997, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/17/us/mexican-long-held-in-
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condemned prisoners are acquitted at a retrial.67 In other cases, death row
inmates are given parole,68 allowed to plead guilty to a lesser charge and
released based on time served,69 or sentenced to life without parole.70
Rarely are formerly condemned prisoners resentenced to death after the
conviction is reversed based on Brady misconduct.71 Thus Brady
violations, if undetected and undeterred, could result in the death of people
who, under the law, deserve either life or liberty.
D. LITIGATING BRADY VIOLATIONS

Under the current state of the law, several factors make pretrial
litigation and adjudication of Brady violations extremely difficult. First,
pretrial disclosure of Brady evidence is governed by an unrealistic “honor

texas-murder-wins-his-freedom.html (reporting that Ricardo Aldape Guerra had spent over
fifteen years in prison and, at one point, came within three days of execution); see also
Chevel Johnson, No Retrial in New Orleans Killing, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 9,
1999 (stating that the youngest person ever sentenced to death row at age seventeen, Shareef
Cousins, was given a new trial in a case involving Brady violations, but the sentence was
ultimately reversed on other grounds because prosecutors did not have enough evidence to
pursue the case a second time).
67
See, e.g., Moore, 969 So. 2d at 185; State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999, 1003 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1994); Richard L. Fricker, State Falters in Retrial of Escaped Con, A.B.A. J., June
1995, at 38 (describing the acquittal of Adolph Munson at re-trial after ten years on death
row); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Exonerations: Jury Acquits Former Death Row Inmate of All
Charges,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/exonerations-jury-acquits-former-death-rowinmate-all-charges (last visited Jan. 19, 2010) (describing the acquittal of a man on all counts
in third trial after nearly ten years on death row).
68
Ryan Issues Blanket Clemency, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at 14, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/flash/2003-01/6205191.pdf. Madison Hobley, who
spent eighteen years in prison, most of it on death row, was pardoned by Governor Ryan in
Illinois during his mass purge of prisoners on death row. Id.
69
Dave Von Drehle, Murder Suspects Will Plead Guilty, Leave Court Free, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 15, 1988, at 2G, available at 1988 WLNR 468637 (“U.S. District
Judge George Carr found that detectives deliberately suppressed evidence that might have
pointed to the innocence of Jent and Miller . . . [and that] [t]he State of Florida demonstrated
‘a callous and deliberate disregard for the fundamental principles of truth and fairness that
underlie our criminal system.’”).
70
Smith, 615 A.2d 321; Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence Cases: 1984-1993,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-cases-1984-1993 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010)
(describing the ultimate disposition in the Smith case where defendant’s original death
sentence was reduced to life in prison).
71
See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10,
1999, at 1, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-dptrialerrorspecial,0,632955.special. Of the sixty-seven death row inmates granted new trials due to
Brady violations, twenty-four were freed because charges were dropped, they were acquitted
at re-trial, or they were given full pardons. Three plead guilty in return for their immediate
release from prison, twenty-five others were convicted again (but did not receive the death
penalty), and only four returned to death row. Id.
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code” system. Prosecutors are in exclusive possession of the evidence
collected during the criminal investigation. They alone are entrusted to
exercise their discretion and make a subjective evaluation of the case to
determine whether there is favorable evidence subject to disclosure.72 Even
if the prosecutor determines that favorable evidence exists, it is the
prosecutor who is entrusted with determining when, if at all, that evidence
will be disclosed to the defense. Lower courts charged with enforcing the
Brady mandate have repeatedly ruled that Brady does not require pretrial
disclosure even when the government is aware of the favorable evidence
prior to trial.73 Prosecutors need only disclose favorable evidence to the
defense “in time for its effective use at trial.”74 Thus, prosecutors can (and
do) purposely withhold Brady evidence until the last possible minute (and
beyond) with full knowledge that the vital information in their exclusive
possession could significantly bolster the defense case or seriously
undermine the government’s case.75
Moreover, prosecutors are also empowered to make the pretrial
determination of whether a particular piece of favorable evidence meets the
materiality standard. Many courts have observed that the impact-based
analysis used to determine materiality is unworkable as a pretrial standard
for prosecutors attempting in good faith to comply with Brady.76 The
Supreme Court also acknowledged as much in Agurs, when it stated that the
pretrial materiality determination is “inevitably imprecise” and recognized
that “the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted
accurately until the entire record is complete.”77 As Justice Marshall stated
in his opinion in Bagley, rather than promoting full and complete
72

See, e.g., Moore, 969 So. 2d at 175 (noting that the prosecutor testified that “he never
intended to withhold exculpatory information and that he did not consider some of the
materials to be exculpatory”).
73
See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 n.9 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[D]isclosure in time for effective use at
trial is all that the Brady doctrine requires.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1143 (5th ed. 2009).
74
Coppa, 267 F.3d at 142.
75
E.g., Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (finding that a mid-trial
four-day delay prior to disclosure of exculpatory information constitutes a Brady violation);
People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (discussed supra notes 134-137
and accompanying text); Page v. Roberts, 611 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(granting new trial when district attorney kept exculpatory statement for over a year until the
day prior to the start of trial when witness could no longer be found).
76
See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Most
prosecutors are neither neutral (nor should they be) nor prescient, and any such judgment [on
materiality] necessarily is speculative on so many matters that simply are unknown and
unknowable before trial begins . . . .”).
77
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
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disclosure, the materiality standard legitimizes nondisclosure by allowing
prosecutors to determine which favorable evidence is material and will be
disclosed and which favorable evidence is not material and can be
constitutionally withheld. 78
While the Court has expressed its hope that “the prudent prosecutor
will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,” there is no assurance
that all prosecutors will heed the Court’s caution and err on the side of
disclosure.79 Other than the unenforceable “honor code,” there are few
incentives for prosecutors to comply with Brady because there is no
meaningful judicial oversight of the process.80 The trial judge does not
know what evidence exists in the government’s files, what evidence the
prosecutor has withheld, or why the prosecutor has unilaterally decided not
to disclose certain evidence to the defense. Prosecutors do not have to keep
a log of the evidence in the case. Nor are prosecutors required to seek an in
camera review of potential Brady evidence prior to making the decision
that evidence will not be disclosed. As a result, the trial court has only a
limited ability to make a pretrial determinations of whether the prosecutor
has fully complied with Brady.
The lack of judicial oversight of Brady disclosure decisions is
compounded by the fact that, absent extraordinary circumstances, it is very
likely that the defense will never learn of the existence of favorable
evidence and cannot, therefore, seek leave of the court to compel disclosure.
The very nature of the act of withholding evidence ensures that the defense
does not know that such evidence is contained in the prosecutor’s nonpublic
case file. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the defense learns of
Brady evidence by pure accident.81 Sometimes the defense stumbles upon a
78

See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700 (1985) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
79
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1994).
80
LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 24.3(b) at 1147-48 (noting that trial courts are reluctant to
review prosecutor’s files to determine whether they have undisclosed Brady material); cf.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (limiting authority of the court to impose in
camera review for disputed Brady material).
81
United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that exculpatory
contents of a tape recording were obtained by defense post-trial when prosecutor
inadvertently sent transcripts of the tapes to the defense attorney); see McMillian v. State,
616 So. 2d 933, 945 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (involving a tape recording inadvertently given
to defense counsel wherein the sheriff and other law enforcement officers were threatening
the government’s star witness to force him to falsely implicate McMillan); Armstrong &
Possley, supra note 71 (discussing the case of James Richardson who was wrongly convicted
in Florida and served twenty-one years in prison before exculpatory evidence was “stolen
from a prosecutor’s office by a man dating the prosecutor’s secretary”; also reporting on
other cases wherein exculpatory evidence was discovered after “a judge directed the U.S.
marshal to seize the prosecutors’ documents, or because newspapers sued under the Freedom
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lay witness who possesses the information.82 Alternatively, as in the
Stevens case, members of the prosecution team belatedly come forward and
disclose the existence of favorable evidence. The constitutional right of
criminal defendants to acquire exculpatory evidence for use at trial should
not depend on sheer luck or the industriousness of the defense investigative
team. As the Court recognized in Banks: “[a] rule thus declaring
‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.”83
E. BRADY REFORM PROPOSALS

Numerous Brady reforms have been proposed by jurists and legal
scholars over the past two decades to address the myriad of problems
associated with the enforcement of the Brady mandate. Notwithstanding
these reform efforts, the Brady disclosure duty has become one of the most
unenforced constitutional mandates in the criminal justice system.84
According to several major national studies, Brady violations in state and
federal courts have been continuous and persistent over the forty-five years
since the Brady decision.85 One landmark study found that during the first
of Information Act, or because of anonymous tips, conversations accidentally overheard or
papers spied in a prosecutor’s hand”); see also Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 869 (1997) (stating that judicial opinions involving
Brady violations “appear in the reporters only because the criminal defendant, deprived of
any knowledge of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor’s refusal to disclose it, was
nevertheless able my some other means (often highly fortuitous) to discover its existence”).
82
E.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675 (2004) (noting that “long suppressed
evidence came to light” after attorneys for death row defendant received affidavits from
government witnesses detailing that, contrary to trial testimony, and the representations of
prosecutors, witnesses were coached, paid for their testimony and threatened with
incarceration if they did not provide false inculpatory testimony against the defendant); State
v. Moore, 969 So. 2d 169, 173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (stating that defense was alerted to
exculpatory information by witness who contacted defense counsel after trial); State v.
Cousin, 710 So. 2d 1065, 1067 n.2 (La. 1998) (stating that the defense learned “through an
anonymous communication” during the penalty phase of a capital case that eyewitness who
identified defendant as murderer previously told police that she could not identify the
gunman because she did not get a good look at him, was not wearing her glasses, and could
only see shapes and patterns).
83
Banks, 540 U.S. at 696.
84
See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 5:1, 5:3 (2d ed. 2002)
(“Nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors . . . account[s] for more
miscarriages of justice than any other type of prosecutorial infraction.”).
85
See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 71; see also HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 60,
at i (reporting that a three-year study of over eleven thousand reported opinions involving
prosecutorial misconduct (including Brady violations) found that over two thousand cases
led to reversal of conviction and twenty-eight defendants were later exonerated); see also
Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1998, at A1, available
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thirty-six years after Brady, 381 homicide cases across the country were
reversed due to Brady violations.86 A 2009 study further confirmed that
Brady violations continue to be an on-going problem.87
Reform efforts to combat Brady violations are frequently stalled by
non-reformers (usually prosecutors and former prosecutors) who persist in
the assertion that Brady violations are an extremely rare occurrence.88
Given the hundreds of thousands of cases prosecuted annually across the
country, they argue that the number of reported Brady violations is de
minimis.89 Moreover, the small minority of prosecutors committing Brady
violations are far outnumbered by the overwhelming number of ethical
prosecutors committed to ensuring that justice is done and that all Brady
evidence is properly disclosed to the defense.90 Thus, non-reformers
maintain that Brady violations are more “episodic” than “epidemic”91 and
that many of the proposed reforms unnecessarily interfere with the
independence of the prosecution function. These proposed reforms, they
contend, would curtail the broad discretion that prosecutors must have to
perform their jobs effectively and free from undue judicial interference.92
at http://www.post-gazette.com/win/ (documenting, in a ten-part series, a two-year
investigation into prosecutorial misconduct (including Brady violations) across the country).
86
Armstrong & Possley, supra note 71.
87
TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 26 (citing numerous New
York cases involving Brady violations and stating that “despite the clarity and longevity of
the Brady rule, a sampling of recent published or otherwise available decisions show such
conduct still occurs”).
88
Randall D. Eliason, The Prosecutor’s Role: A Response to Professor Davis, AM. U.
CRIM. L. BRIEF, Fall 2006, at 15, 17-18, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/
clb/documents/CriminalLawBrief-VolIIIssueI-Fall2006.pdf?rd=1 (commenting that given
the number of prosecutors in the country (over 35,000) and the number of criminal cases
prosecuted each year (twenty million in state courts and 70,000 in federal courts), the
incidences of prosecutorial misconduct are extremely small).
89
Id. at 20 (dismissing statistics from Harmful Error study which found serious
prosecutorial misconduct (including Brady violations) in a total of two thousand cases
(average of sixty-six cases per year) as statistically insignificant because “sixty-six cases per
year out of several million is a vanishingly small number. Even if the true incidence of
prosecutorial misconduct, reported and unreported, were 500 times greater than what was
found[,] . . . it would still involve only about one percent of all serious criminal cases filed in
a year.” (emphasis omitted)).
90
Id. at 17 (“[T]he vast majority of prosecutors are dedicated public servants striving to
do a difficult job in an ethical and honorable way.”).
91
HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 60, at 110 (providing a copy of a letter from an Oregon
prosecutor stating that prosecutorial misconduct is “episodic” and not “epidemic,” and
stating that “prosecutors continue to be subject to the harshest sanctions on those truly rare
occasions when they violate their oaths”).
92
TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 36 n.11. In response to a
proposal to have a mandatory Brady conference with the trial judge in criminal cases,
dissenting Task Force members argued that “mandating a pretrial conference in every case
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Non-reformers also steadfastly contend that when Brady violations do
infrequently occur, the wrongful actions of these few errant prosecutors are
adequately addressed by the current mechanisms in place within
prosecution offices and the external sanctioning power of the state bar.93
The “epidemic” versus “episodic” debate, of course, misses the point.
The problem with Brady violations is not the frequency with which they
occur, it is the fact that they occur at all. By definition, Brady violations
involve the withholding of material evidence that has a significant adverse
impact on the accuracy of the guilt/innocence determination. Thus, even
one Brady violation is too many when such misconduct can and does result
in a wrongful conviction or a sentence of death. Just as it would be
unacceptable to allow a preventable or curable disease to go untreated
simply because it affects only a small number of people each year, we
cannot allow Brady violations—even if infrequent and isolated—to remain
“untreated.” In the fair and just criminal justice system we strive to create,
we should have zero tolerance for these preventable errors.
Against the backdrop of this ongoing reform debate, legal scholars and
jurists have proposed a wide array of reforms. Some of the proposed
reforms would simply mandate better enforcement and utilization of
existing laws and standards. For example, many have proposed more
aggressive use of the state bar disciplinary process to punish prosecutors for
violating the professional standards that make it unethical for them to
withhold favorable evidence.94 While the use of the state bar disciplinary
process is a viable option, numerous studies and reports have shown that
for judicial review of the prosecutor’s file impermissibly allows the judicial branch to
intrude into the exclusive domain of a member of the executive branch, the prosecutor, in the
advocacy determination of what to disclose and when; weakens the adversary system and the
vigorous performance of the prosecutor’s function.” Id. (citations omitted).
93
Eliason, supra note 88, at 21 (citing the state bar disciplinary process and the
Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility as powerful sources of
“professional repercussions” for errant prosecutors who engage in misconduct).
94
E.g., CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 77 (Gerald Uelmen
ed., 2008) (discussing judicial reluctance to refer lawyers for professional discipline for
Brady misconduct), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf;
see also TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 28-29; Robert P.
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental
Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007); Paul J. Speigelman,
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 170 (1999) (noting that of forty-five recent federal cases where
convictions were reversed due to “intentional misconduct and extensive criticism of
prosecutors’ conduct, not one court ordered a prosecutor disciplined or referred a prosecutor
for discipline”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275 (2004) (advocating the creation of an
independent commission to examine wrongful convictions cases and enforce disciplinary
rules for prosecutors).
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prosecutors are generally not referred for disciplinary action for Brady
misconduct, and it is extremely rare that such a referral results in
professional discipline.95 Thus, without greater enforcement of ethical
rules, reliance on the state bar disciplinary process to deter and punish
Brady misconduct is misplaced.
A second category of proposed Brady reforms would require major
changes in existing law to implement. Legal scholars have proposed
subjecting prosecutors to civil liability for their actions by eliminating or
reducing the broad immunity prosecutors currently enjoy.96 In light of
recent Supreme Court precedent upholding prosecutorial immunity, this
proposal is not likely to succeed.97 Other reform proposals, including the
use of criminal sanctions and contempt citations against prosecutors, are
also very rarely used.98 Moreover, the effectiveness of these measures
95

Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987) (discussing the results of a nation-wide empirical
study of state bar disciplinary actions for Brady violations and finding few prosecutors are
referred and even fewer are actually disciplined); see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) (discussing Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which defines the scope of the prosecutor’s duty to make timely
disclosure of exculpatory evidence under ethics rules independent of the constitutional
disclosure duty); see also HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 60, at 81-90. But see Amended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No.
06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n July 24, 2007), available at
http://www.ncbar.gov/Nifong%20Final%20Order.pdf. In the high profile investigation of
allegations that an African-American woman was gang-raped at an off-campus party hosted
by college students who were members of the Duke University lacrosse team, the prosecutor
violated Brady by suppressing exculpatory DNA results that excluded the defendants and by
instructing a doctor to withhold such evidence from his medical report. The prosecutor was
held in contempt following an independent investigation. Id. See generally Angela J. Davis,
The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
275 (2007).
96
Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the
district attorney’s failure to train employees on their Brady obligations and “the duty not to
lie or persecute the innocent” subjected her to liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1983); see also
Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (following reprosecution of defendant by the same prosecutor who “allegedly slammed his case file
against the courtroom wall, screamed at [the defendant Yarris], ‘Motherfucker, you’ll never
leave the county alive!’ and spat in Yarris’s face,” and finding that prosecutor’s conduct in
destroying exculpatory evidence was not covered by absolute immunity).
97
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) (holding that the chief deputy
district attorney and district attorney were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity).
98
Weeks, supra note 81, at 879 (dismissing as improbable “the alternative of criminal
sanctions for civil rights violations” due to Brady violations). But see United States v. Jones,
609 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Mass. 2009) (requiring the government to show cause why the court
should not impose sanctions for Brady violation after the prosecutor failed to turn over the
inconsistent statements of a police officer). Also, some state court rules and statutes
expressly recognize contempt as a discovery sanction. E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
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depends on the willingness of individual judges and prosecution offices to
take punitive measures against errant prosecutors. Judges have been
reluctant to take action, and as one scholar noted, “[p]rosecutors simply will
not prosecute other prosecutors.”99
Similarly, some scholars and jurists have proposed amending Rule 16,
the criminal discovery provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to include mandatory disclosure of Brady evidence.100 Included
among the provisions of the potential Rule 16 amendment is a requirement
that prosecutors make timely disclosure of all favorable evidence,
irrespective of any pretrial materiality determination they have made.101
This Brady amendment to Rule 16 was vigorously opposed by the
Department of Justice and ultimately defeated.102
The final category of Brady reforms involves administrative changes
within prosecution offices to enhance compliance with the Brady disclosure

Art. 729.5(B) (2003) (stating that willful violation of discovery rule “shall be deemed to be a
constructive contempt of court”); see also ARK R. CRIM. P. 19.7(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.220(n)(2); HAW. R. PENAL P. 16(9)(ii); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g)(ii); MINN. R. CRIM. P.
9.03(8); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.2(g)(2); WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(7)(ii).
99
Weeks, supra note 81, at 879.
100
Brady Report, supra note 35, at 6. The proposed “Brady Amendment” to Rule 16
provided:
Exculpatory or Impeaching Information. Upon a defendant’s request, the government must
make available all information that is known to the attorney for the government or agents of law
enforcement involved in the investigation of the case that is either exculpatory or impeaching.
The court may not order disclosure of impeachment information earlier than 14 days before trial.

Id. at 23 app. A (emphasis omitted) (providing the text of the Brady Amendment); see also
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information
Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93 (2004).
101
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 100, at 113.
102
See Brady Report, supra note 35, at 4. In opposition to the Rule 16 amendment, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued before the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Advisory Committee”) that no codification of the Brady
rule was warranted because the Brady disclosure obligation was already “clearly defined”
under existing law. Id. at 6-7. Although DOJ opposed the amendment, DOJ representatives
revised the Department of Justice Manual for United States Attorneys in an effort to more
clearly define the scope of the Brady disclosure duty under existing law. See also id. at 6-7,
43 app. D (providing the text of United States Attorney’s Policy Regarding Disclosure of
Exculpatory and Impeachment Information, § 9-5.001). Following the Ted Stevens
litigation, the federal judge who presided over the case, Judge Emmet Sullivan, wrote a letter
to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee urging reconsideration of the Brady
Amendment to Rule 16. Letter from Judge Emmett G. Sullivan to Judge Richard C.
Tallman, Chair, Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Apr. 28, 2009) (on file with author). Judge Sullivan wrote: “An amendment to
Rule 16 that requires the government to produce all exculpatory information to the defense
serves the best interests of the court, the prosecution, the defense, and ultimately the public.”
Id.
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duty. These reforms include improved training, the creation of detailed
guidelines on Brady disclosure,103 and administrative procedures to track
and catalog Brady evidence to make disclosure more efficient.104 Advocates
of these internal reforms suggest that such measures would combat
confusion over the scope of the disclosure duty and avoid carelessness or
negligent nondisclosures.
While some of these proposals could potentially curb Brady violations
when nondisclosure is the result of carelessness or negligence, it is unlikely
that many of these measures would be sufficient to curb the more egregious,
intentional Brady violations committed by prosecutors determined to “win
at all costs.” In numerous cases, nondisclosure is the result of a deliberate
choice to withhold evidence that the prosecutor knows is subject to
disclosure under Brady. The intentional, purposeful nature of the Brady
violation in those cases is illustrated by the varied excuses articulated by
prosecutors in defense of their decisions to conceal Brady evidence. For
example, prosecutors have defended their intentional suppression of Brady
evidence on the grounds that (1) the witness that provided an exculpatory
pretrial statement was not, in the prosecutor’s mind, a credible witness;105

103
CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 87-91
(recommending that State Attorney General formulate and disseminate a written office
policy to govern Brady compliance, create a “Brady list” of impeachment evidence against
law enforcement officers/witnesses, and hold training programs on Brady disclosure
compliance); see also JOHN F. TERZANO ET AL., IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY:
A
POLICY
REVIEW
3-6
(2009),
available
at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/pr-improving-prosecutorialaccountability1.pdf (recommending increased training for line prosecutors on Brady
disclosure duties); TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 37-38
(recommending same).
104
ABA CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMM. TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY
OF THE CRIM. PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE
GUILTY 1, 103 (2006) (“In light of the prosecutor’s on-going obligation to disclose Brady
material and the desire to provide all defendants with fair trial, prosecutors should establish
guidelines and procedures for turning Brady evidence over to the defense and for receiving
that information from its partners and agents, including police departments and
laboratories.”); CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 12-16;
TERZANO ET AL., supra note 103, at 7-8; Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants:
Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 619, 641 (2007) (advocating for the head
prosecutor to provide “clearer guidance that ensures complete compliance with Brady,” and
proposing “open file” discovery to give defense attorneys greater access to discoverable
materials); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 257 (2008).
105
In United States v. Harrington, the government failed to disclose the existence of a
witness who contradicted the trial testimony of the government’s star witness and implicated
that witness as the true perpetrator of the crime. The government claimed that it did not
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(2) the exculpatory evidence was not subject to disclosure because it would
have been inadmissible at trial;106 (3) the exculpatory statement was not
Brady evidence because the same statement also contained other
inculpatory information;107 or (4) the prosecutor did not personally believe
the witness’s pretrial inconsistent statement was credible.108 It is difficult to
accept that prosecutors in possession of evidence that falls squarely within
the scope of the Brady doctrine could honestly form the professional
opinion that disclosure was not mandated for any of these reasons. As one
court stated in rejecting a prosecutor’s incredulous excuse for suppressing
blatantly exculpatory evidence, “Such an explanation is laughable, offering
it an effrontery. It does not wash, nor do we believe for a moment that the
prosecutor could have been so simple-minded as to have believed it
would.”109
Thus, although the wide array of reform proposals that have been
advanced by jurists and legal scholars have the potential to greatly improve
disclose the witness’s pretrial statements to the defense because the government did not find
the witness to be credible. In reversing the murder conviction, the trial judge stated:
[B]oth the identity and the testimony of Ms. Gibson, unquestionably, without any doubt, should
have been turned over to the defense well in advance of trial. . . . [T]he information about Ms.
Gibson’s identity and her information and her grand jury testimony and her police statement was
withheld from the defense consciously, deliberately, and as a tactic, because I think the
Government probably recognized it as not particularly favorable to their case, at a minimum,
and may have recognized it as something that could be mischievous in the hands of a good
defense lawyer. . . . In my opinion, it was patently disclosable, not a debatable point. . . . [T]he
government’s attempt to explain away the evidence that is, in my view obviously favorable to the
accused, is unavailing largely for the reason pointed out by [defense counsel]: It’s not for [the
prosecutor] to decide whether Ms. Gibson would be believable . . . it’s for the jury to decide . . . .

Transcript of Hearing on Post-Trial Motion to Dismiss at 9-10, 13, United States v.
Harrington, No. 2007-CF1-22855 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with author)
(emphasis added).
106
Branch v. State, 469 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (arguing that a lack of
proper chain-of-custody excused the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the knife purportedly
belonging to decedent that was given to the police shortly after a fatal brawl).
107
Gwen Filosa, Review Board Clears Prosecutor, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 25, 2004, at
B1 (discussing statements made by Roger Jordan, a seasoned prosecutor in New Orleans,
during a state bar disciplinary proceeding related to his prosecution of Shareef Cousins for
capital murder); see also State v. Cousins, 710 So. 2d 1065, 1066-67 (La. 1998) (discussed
supra note 66).
108
Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1985) (“As for the prosecutor’s
attempted explanation of his refusal to produce the police report[,] . . . [i]t was for the jury,
not the prosecutor, to decide whether the contents of an official police record were credible,
especially where—as here—they were in the nature of an admission against the state’s
interest in prosecuting Lindsey. On such grounds as these, prosecutors might, on a claim
that they thought it unreliable, refuse to produce any matter whatever helpful to the
defense.”); see, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009) (discussed infra
Part IV).
109
King, 769 F.2d at 1040.
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the disclosure of Brady evidence, comprehensive Brady reform must also
include measures specifically designed to address intentional, purposeful
violations. The two proposals discussed in Parts III and IV below
recommend the presentation of evidence of the Brady misconduct at trial
either as a punitive sanction or as relevant circumstantial evidence of the
government’s consciousness of a weak case.
III: THE “BRADY INSTRUCTION” SANCTION
If a young boy takes his sister’s rag doll and purposely hides it from
her to prevent his little sister from playing with the doll, upon learning of
her son’s behavior, the mother will likely order her son to return the doll
and instruct the little boy not to take his sister’s toy again. Is more
punishment of the little boy mandated? Probably not. While the mother
clearly has the authority and the discretion to impose more severe sanctions,
like ordering the little boy to forego playing with his own toys for a while,
the little boy’s transgression probably is not serious enough to warrant more
than a mild rebuke from his mother. If instead of a rag doll, the little boy
intentionally withheld his sister’s asthma inhaler while she was gasping for
air during an asthma attack, the mother would undoubtedly view her son’s
conduct with greater disdain and feel it necessary and appropriate to impose
a sanction beyond simply ordering him to give his sister the medication. In
the criminal justice system, the suppression of Brady evidence is treated
with the triviality of a lost rag doll, when it should be treated with the
exigency of an asthma attack. Instead of exercising its broad authority to
impose appropriate, meaningful sanctions, courts simply order the
government to disclose the Brady evidence and offer the defense a
continuance to “catch its breath” before the next trial date. As discussed
more fully below, compelled disclosure, without more, is an inadequate
sanction for the intentional destruction or withholding of Brady material,
because it does little to enforce the constitutionally mandated disclosure
duty and does even less to deter future violations.
Given the fact that the existing extrajudicial entities with the power to
regulate prosecutors and punish Brady misconduct have been ineffective or
underutilized, the burden falls on judges to redress Brady misconduct.110 In
addition to the direct assault on the defendant’s right to a fair trial, Brady
violations corrupt the fact-finding process of the trial.111 As Justice
110

Joy, supra note 104, at 631 (stating that until systemic reforms are implemented
judges have the responsibility to take measures to curtail Brady violations).
111
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (“The very integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within
the framework of the rules of evidence.”); see also Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial
Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37
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Brennan stated, “Criminal discovery is not a game. It is integral to the
quest for truth and the fair adjudication of guilt or innocence. Violations of
discovery rules thus cannot go uncorrected or undeterred without
undermining the truthseeking process.”112 Moreover, nondisclosure of
Brady evidence gives prosecutors the authority to usurp the power of the
trial judge and unilaterally decide what evidence will be presented at trial
and what evidence will be excluded.113 In so doing, the jury is forced to
reach a verdict based on a distorted, “prosecution-friendly” version of the
facts. Predictably, this leads to unreliable verdicts, wrongful convictions,
and the erosion of public confidence in the ability of the judicial system to
convict only the guilty and free the innocent. Courts, therefore, have a
vested interest in imposing meaningful sanctions to thwart this invidious
form of prosecutorial misconduct to vindicate the affront to judicial
integrity. The goal advanced by imposing meaningful sanctions for Brady
violations is not merely to punish the individual prosecutor but to ensure
that the government does not feel empowered to violate constitutional
mandates with impunity.114 Jurists and legal scholars are in accord that
sanctions should be imposed not only to protect the defendant’s right to a
fair trial but also to deter future Brady violations.115
SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 344 (2007) (“[W]hen left unchecked [prosecutorial] misconduct
undermines the integrity of the system itself, thereby threatening the equally important
appearance of a fair trial. . . . [T]here is an incalculable cost in damaged integrity [to the
judicial system itself] that may be difficult to repair[.]”) (alteration in original) (emphasis
omitted); Joy, supra note 104, at 628 (“When false testimony is introduced into evidence, or
exculpatory evidence is withheld from the defendant for possible use at trial, the justice
system is derailed.”); Paul J. Speigelman, supra note 94, at 131 (“Intentional wrongdoing in
court by perhaps the most critical member of the government law enforcement team calls
into question the fairness and integrity of the trial.”).
112
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991
(9th Cir. 2005) (“When prosecutors betray their solemn obligations and abuse the immense
power they hold, the fairness of our entire justice system is called into doubt and public
confidence in it is undermined.”).
113
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (stating that the disclosure duties
imposed by the Brady doctrine “preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s
private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal
accusations”).
114
Dale A. Nance, Evidentiary Foul Play: The Roles of Judge and Jury in Responding to
Evidence Tampering, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 3 (2009) (stating that deterrence of
discovery misconduct is a goal of imposing discovery sanctions, but noting that sanctions are
not designed to punish the litigant but constitute an “effort to protect the integrity of the
system of adjudication by refusing to submit cases to the jury when they have been
inappropriately prepared”).
115
United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Quite as important as
assuring a fair trial to the defendants now before us is assuring that the circumstances that
gave rise to the misconduct won’t be repeated in other cases.”); State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d
384 (Minn. 1982) (stating that reversal of conviction is sometimes warranted not simply to
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A. THE CURRENT SANCTIONS SCHEME FOR BRADY VIOLATIONS

The Supreme Court has never articulated the range of sanctions that
should be imposed when the government fails to comply with the Brady
disclosure duty.116 In practice, when Brady violations are discovered after
trial, the usual remedy is a new trial in which the previously withheld
evidence can be introduced by the defense.117 When Brady violations are
discovered pretrial, the court usually orders the government to disclose the
suppressed evidence and, if necessary, grants a continuance in order to give
the defense the opportunity to make effective use of the exculpatory
information.118 Simply ordering the prosecutor to disclose the Brady
evidence is, of course, more of a directive than a sanction, because the
prosecutor is not required to do anything above and beyond that which was
already constitutionally mandated.119 Under this scheme, the consequences
of noncompliance with Brady are identical to the consequences of
compliance—disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense. Therefore,
simply mandating compelled disclosure as a Brady sanction is not a potent
deterrent to prosecutors who would purposely withhold favorable evidence.
Likewise, granting a continuance of the trial date in response to a
Brady violation is not an effective sanction alternative because of the wide
range of collateral consequences. First, defendants that have been detained
pretrial are forced to endure a more prolonged loss of liberty if a
continuance of the trial date is necessitated by the government’s failure to
comply with its Brady disclosure duty. In jurisdictions with crowded court
dockets, the length of the delay could extend for several months. Moreover,
following the disclosure of the previously suppressed Brady evidence, the
remedy a potentially unjust trial result, but as a means to provide the incentive to prosecutors
to obey disclosure obligations); see also Weeks, supra note 81, at 913 (“By increasing
substantially the risk of reversal as a sanction for suppression of exculpatory evidence,
the . . . standards might reasonably be expected to increase the degree of disclosure by
prosecutors anxious to avoid this result.”). See generally Cynthia E. Jones, The Right
Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial Sanctions for the Destruction of DNA Evidence,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2945 nn.288-89 (discussing the goals advanced by discovery
sanctions).
116
See Thomas F. Liotti, The Uneven Playing Field, Part III or What’s on the Discovery
Channel, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 67, 74 (2003) (concluding that Brady violations must be met
with “real remedies with serious consequences for prosecutors who fail to comply”).
117
See LAFAVE, supra note 73, at 1143.
118
Id.
119
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery
Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness
of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 794 (discussing Judge Myron Bright’s
observation that merely ordering disclosure as a sanction for discovery misconduct is
ineffective because “it does little good to merely order a litigant to do what he should have
done four months before”).
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defense will be required to spend additional time, money, and effort to
make effective use of the new information (locating witnesses, hiring
experts, seeking forensic testing, pursuing investigative leads).120 This, in
turn, leads to the needless waste of judicial resources when courts must
respond to additional motions and conduct evidentiary hearings stemming
from the belated disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Consequently, to
create a strong disincentive for prosecutors to suppress Brady evidence, and
to prevent this needless waste of time and resources in the criminal justice
system, courts must do more than grant a continuance of the trial date to
redress Brady misconduct.
At the other end of the sanctions spectrum is the remedy of dismissal.
Though dismissal of the indictment would be an effective sanction to deter
prosecutors from suppressing Brady evidence and would adequately
address the harm to defendants and the courts, dismissal is a “disfavored” or
“drastic”121 sanction that is rarely imposed.122 Generally, courts will only
dismiss criminal charges as a sanction for Brady violations when there is a
pattern of egregious Brady violations or when Brady evidence has been
permanently lost or destroyed by the government.123 While some state
court rules expressly allow for dismissal as a sanction for “particularly

120

Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 26. Defense counsel stated:

The efforts that were made by . . . the Defense in this case to obtain discovery and Brady
material are unprecedented . . . . [O]f the thousands of hours we spent defending Ted Stevens, I
would estimate that 25 percent to a third of the time was focused on things we shouldn’t have
had to ask for, discovery and Brady material time and time again.
121

Id.; People v. Kelly, 467 N.E.2d 498, 501 (N.Y. 1984) (finding a discovery violation
and stating “as a general matter the drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where
less severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence”); see e.g., People v.
Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff’d, 695 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (holding that dismissal was not an appropriate sanction where witness suffered
memory loss but court permitted the introduction of prior statements at trial).
122
JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE, FORMS 5-109
(4th ed. 2008) (stating that counsel may expect dismissal of charges to be rare and that the
more expected procedure will be the exclusion of certain evidence or the granting of a
continuance). See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5.22,
at 5-43 to -45 (2d ed. 2008) (supplemented annually) (stating that the court exceeds its
authority in granting dismissal as a sanction for Brady violation where a less severe sanction
could have cured the violation).
123
United States v. Pollock, 417 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Mass. 1976) (emphasizing that
dismissal was the only adequate sanction when notes that may have corroborated the defense
theory that the defendant was working undercover as an agent for a government agency were
intentionally destroyed in bad faith); Jones, supra note 115, at 2916 n.146 (citing numerous
cases where courts found dismissal warranted due to destruction of Brady evidence or
“flagrant” Brady violations); see also Ferrera v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006)
(affirming district court’s motion to vacate defendant’s conviction under the federal RICO
statute based on prosecutor’s failure to disclose a key witness’s recantation).
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egregious” Brady violations,124 other jurisdictions prohibit dismissal as “too
severe” of a sanction for Brady misconduct.125 Thus, absent extreme
facts,126 courts very rarely dismiss a criminal case due to Brady
124

See DIST. MASS. LOCAL R. 1.3 (“Failure to comply with any of the directions or
obligations set forth in, or authorized by, these Local Rules may result in dismissal, default,
or the imposition of other sanctions as deemed appropriate by the judicial officer.”); ME. R.
CRIM. P. 16(d); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-910(a)(3b) (2009); see also Brady Report,
supra note 35, at 60.
125
Brady Report, supra note 35, at 60; e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 729.5(A)
(2009) (“If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply with this Chapter or with an order issued pursuant
to this Chapter, the court may . . . enter such other order, other than dismissal, as may be
appropriate.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Davis, 578 F.2d 277, 279-80 (10th Cir.
1978) (holding that new trial, not dismissal, is remedy for suppression of Brady evidence);
People v. Wimberly, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (“Even where the
prosecution acts willfully and in bad faith . . . ‘the extreme sanction of dismissal is rarely
appropriate unless a defendant has established prejudice . . . and the prejudice cannot be
otherwise cured . . . .’”); Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001) (holding that
dismissal of charges was extreme and inappropriate sanction for Brady violation).
126
The 2007 campus shooting at Delaware State University (DSU) is one recent example
of a dismissal based on Brady violations. Order upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
Delaware v. Braden, No. 0709030642 (Del. Super. Ct. May 19, 2009) [hereinafter Braden
Order] (on file with author). On September 21, 2007, shots were fired at a group of students
leaving a DSU campus eatery, leaving one student dead and another student injured. The
investigation eventually led to the arrest of a DSU student, Loyer Braden, who was charged
with second-degree murder and a series of assault and gun charges. The government alleged
that Braden fired the shots to retaliate against a DSU student in the crowd with whom he had
a dispute. Malcolm McQuiston, another DSU student present in the crowd when the shots
were fired, was interviewed by police and later gave a statement exonerating Braden and
identifying two other people as the shooters. Id. According to the government, although the
police turned McQuiston’s statement over to the prosecutors one month after the shooting,
prosecutors never listened to or viewed the tape and were unaware of its content until they
began preparing for trial. State’s Answer to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Delaware v.
Braden, No. 0709030642 (Del. Super. Ct. April 14, 2009). Thus, despite written defense
requests for disclosure of Brady evidence in December 2007 and June 2008, the McQuiston
statement was not disclosed to the defense until April 2009, the eve of trial when jury
selection was about to begin, and only after disclosure was ordered by the court. Braden
Order, supra, at 2-3. By the time of the belated disclosure, McQuiston could not be located,
despite a month-long search by both the defense and the prosecution. The trial judge granted
the defense motion to dismiss based on the government’s loss of Brady evidence. Braden
Order, supra, at 8. Although McQuiston was subsequently located, the government opted
not to appeal the trial judge’s ruling. The government stated that its decision not to appeal
was based, in part, on the fact that a “key” prosecution witness had recanted his original
statement implicating Braden in the shooting. Inexplicably, the government also failed to
inform the defense about this second piece of exculpatory information. See Media Release,
Del. Dep’t of Justice, Delaware Department of Justice Announces Appellate Decision in
Criminal Case Against Defendant Loyer Braden (May 28, 2009), available at
http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/media/releases/2009/appelatedecisioncriminalcase.pdf;
Dismissed Charges Against N.J. Man Accused in Delaware State Shooting Will Not Be
Appealed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 28, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/
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misconduct.127 Although legal scholars and jurists have proposed Brady
reforms that strongly encourage the expanded use of dismissal as a sanction
for intentional violations, those reforms have not been adopted by state and
federal courts.128
While it is well settled that state and federal courts have the power to
impose a wide range of sanctions for Brady violations, courts have not
developed effective sanctions that fall between the minimal sanction of
compelled disclosure and the maximum sanction of dismissal. Even though
all state courts have specific court rules and statutes that govern and
regulate the disclosure of Brady evidence,129 state laws are silent on the
specific sanctions to be imposed for noncompliance with the Brady
disclosure duty.130 Instead, both state and federal courts have relied upon
the discovery sanctions in Rule 16(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or its state law equivalent. Rule 16 authorizes a court to sanction
discovery violations by ordering disclosure, precluding evidence, granting a
continuance, or entering “any other order that is just under the
circumstances.”131 As discussed below, a strongly worded instruction that
2009/05/del_attorney_general_will_not.html; Murder Case Against Suspected Delaware
University Shooter Dismissed, FOXNEWS.COM, May 19, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,520723,00.html.
127
See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 611 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (granting new
trial when district attorney kept exculpatory statement for over a year until the day before
trial when witness could no longer be found).
128
E.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 100, at 120 (proposing the codification
of the Brady disclosure duty in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and advocating
“dismissal of an indictment for failure to comply with Rule 16 upon a showing of substantial
prejudice to the defendant or intentional misconduct by the government”); see also Cicchini,
supra note 111, at 336 (proposing rule requiring automatic mistrial for prosecutorial
misconduct at trial and proposing dismissal with prejudice for intentional prosecutorial
misconduct). But see Peter Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional
Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 827 (1999) (arguing that dismissal of charges should not
be available simply to deter prosecutorial misconduct and stating that courts “should not rely
on granting a particular defendant relief to serve as a check on future prosecutorial actions in
other cases except to the extent necessary to vindicate a specific constitutional protection
breached by the prosecutorial misconduct. . . . [C]onstitutional protections belong to
individuals, not to courts for use as a means to police the conduct of prosecutors.”).
129
See Brady Report, supra note 35, at 49-59.
130
Id. at 59-60.
131
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2) states:
If a party fails to comply with this rule, the court may: (A) order that party to permit the
discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just terms and
conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed
evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances.

Many state rules parallel the federal rule. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.5; ARK. R. CRIM. P.
19.7(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(n)(1); HAW. R. PENAL P. 16(9)(i); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g)(i);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 729.5(A); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03(8); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.2(g)(1);
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informs the jury that the government intentionally suppressed favorable
evidence should be included among the sanctions that is “just under the
circumstances” to redress intentional Brady violations.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE SANCTION: THE “BRADY INSTRUCTION”

Informing the jury of the government’s intentional suppression of
Brady evidence is an appropriate “middle ground” sanction between simple
disclosure and complete dismissal. The proposed “Brady instruction” is
closely akin to adverse inference instructions, also known as “missing
evidence” or “spoliation” instructions. Those specially crafted instructions
are traditionally used by courts to address evidentiary imbalances created
when discoverable or admissible evidence is suspiciously lost or
inexplicably destroyed while in the exclusive possession of an adverse
party.132 Commonly, adverse inference instructions inform jurors that they
are permitted to infer that if the absent evidence had been produced at trial,
it would have been damaging to the party responsible for its loss.133

WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(7)(i). Beyond the Rule 16(d) enumerated sanctions, a
handful of states expressly permit courts to impose additional sanctions, including contempt
or an assessment of costs incurred by opposing party for willful violations. See, e.g., ARK.
R. CRIM. P. 19.7(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(n)(2); HAW. R. PENAL P. 16(9)(ii); ILL. SUP. CT.
R. 415(G)(II); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 729.5(B) (providing that willful violation of
discovery rule “shall be deemed constructive contempt of court”); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03(8);
VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.2(g)(2); WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(7)(ii); see also Brady Report,
supra note 35, at 60 n.136.
132
See State v. Fulminante, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (Ariz. 1999) (“When police negligently fail
to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, an instruction . . . permits the jury to infer that
the evidence would have been exculpatory.”); State v. Willits, 393 P.2d 274, 276, 279 (Ariz.
1964) (ordering the trial court on remand to give an adverse inference instruction as a
sanction for the government’s Brady misconduct and stating that the unfavorable inference
may be sufficient to “create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt”); People v.
Wimberly, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 162-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that trial court properly
gave jury remedial instruction that improper destruction of evidence by prosecution could
support inference adverse to prosecution which might be sufficient to raise reasonable
doubt); State v. Maniccia, 355 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1984) (holding that the defendant’s
right to due process was violated due to the state’s destruction of evidence and imposing an
adverse inference instruction); Tinsley v. Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1989) (citing
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Ky. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 892
S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1994)) (declaring that a “missing evidence instruction” likely would be
sufficient to “offset the prosecutor’s misconduct”).
133
See generally David J. Kessler, Spoliation in Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings:
Theory of Spoliation In Habeas Corpus—Part I, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 14, 16. See also
Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost Evidence, and
the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 293-94 nn.396-97 (2008) (collecting
cases both demanding and relaxing the requirement of proof of bad faith or intentional
destruction of evidence as a prerequisite for an adverse inference instruction).
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While adverse inference instructions are most commonly given when
evidence has been permanently lost, trial judges have infrequently
employed the instructions to redress Brady misconduct. In People v.
Jackson,134 the court imposed an adverse inference instruction following the
government’s intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence. The three
defendants were on trial for a triple homicide that occurred inside an
apartment. Shortly after the crime, the police interviewed a witness,
Nicholas Taylor, and memorialized his oral statement. Thereafter, Taylor
gave a sworn statement to the prosecutor. In both statements, Taylor stated
that he was in the hallway outside of the apartment when the victims were
shot and he saw one of the victims open the apartment door after the
defendant departed the premises. Taylor stated that he saw the defendant
standing outside of the apartment building at the time the victims were
killed in the apartment. For three years, the government did not disclose
Taylor’s exculpatory statements to the defense. Due to his severe learning
disabilities, Taylor was unable to recall any of the critical details of his
earlier statements by the time of trial. The court found that the
government’s failure to make timely disclosure of Taylor’s “extremely
exculpatory” statement was intentional and prejudicial to the defense.135
The court also found that sanctions were warranted because the government
was well aware of the fact that Taylor’s disability created “a high
probability of failing memory.”136 The court denied a defense request for
dismissal but permitted the defense to introduce Taylor’s two pretrial
statements, and it ruled that “the jury will be provided with an adverse
inference charge regarding the Brady violation by the People.”137
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide additional support for
the use of a Brady instruction to redress the intentional suppression of
Brady evidence. Rule 37 empowers the court to impose sanctions on civil
litigants and specifically authorizes the court to “inform the jury of the
party’s failure” to disclose discoverable material.138 Rule 37 was amended
134

People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
Id. at 189-91. The government admitted that it was aware of the statement but argued
that Taylor’s statement did not fall within Brady because there were several inconsistencies
in Taylor’s statements, and the government did not consider them credible. Id. at 186-87.
The court summarily rejected this contention as “disingenuous” and found that the
exculpatory value of Taylor’s statements “is evident on its face” without regard to the
prosecutor’s unilateral assessment of the credibility of the witness’s account.
136
Id. at 190.
137
Id. at 191.
138
Rule 37(c)(1)(B) provides that where a party “fails to provide information or identify
a witness,” the court can employ a wide range of sanctions, including “inform[ing] the jury
of the party’s failure.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(B); see Tarlton v. Cumberland County Corr.
Facility, 192 F.R.D. 165 (D.N.J. 2000) (discussing discovery obligations in civil cases and
135
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to include the jury instruction sanction in order to enhance the court’s
power to enforce the disclosure duties imposed on civil litigants.139
Specifically, the Advisory Committee noted:
Preclusion of evidence is not an effective incentive to compel disclosure of
information that, being supportive of the position of the opposing party, might
advantageously be concealed by the disclosing party. However, the rule provides for
a wide range of other sanctions—such as . . . allowing the jury to be informed of the
fact of nondisclosure—that . . . can be imposed when found to be warranted after a
140
hearing.

Rule 37 should be instructive to trial judges in criminal cases seeking
to impose meaningful sanctions for noncompliance with Brady disclosure
duties. The practical recognition in the civil rules that strong sanctions are
necessary to ensure the disclosure of unfavorable information that might
“advantageously be concealed” by a litigant mirrors the concerns over
nondisclosure of Brady evidence. As a matter of policy, if adverse
inference instructions have been expressly adopted as a sanction in civil
cases in which the verdict will, at most, cause a litigant to suffer pecuniary
losses, there is no principled justification for not imposing the sanction in
criminal cases in which the verdict could result in a loss of liberty or life.
Recognizing the disparity between the higher standards imposed upon civil
litigants than imposed upon the government in criminal cases, one judge
remarked, “Surely if that rule is to be invoked to protect the pocketbook of
an insurance company it should be invoked in the instant case to protect
natural persons from being sent to jail unjustly.”141

the mandatory nature of Rule 37 sanctions). The jury instruction sanction was imposed by
the court in McCloud v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd., No. 04-1118, 2007
WL 2584289, at *5 (D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2007), where the court found that the defendant’s
response to discovery was “at best deliberately misleading and at worst a deliberate attempt
to hide the identity of a damning witness.” See also Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 508
(M.D. Pa. 1996) (concluding that destruction of the evidence “requires a jury instruction on
the spoliation inference”); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
§ 7:2 (stating that in Slessinger v. Walt Disney Corp., Case No. BC 022365 (Cal. Super. Ct.
June 16, 2000), the trial judge instructed the jury that it “may infer that Disney willfully
suppressed evidence in order to prevent such evidence from being presented in this trial and
the jury may consider that fact in determining what inferences to draw from the evidence”).
139
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 1987 amendment.
140
Id.
141
See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks, 155 F.2d 631, 658 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the court for finding harmless improper statements made by the
prosecutor at trial and noting that similar conduct would have been reversible error in a civil
case).
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1. The Formulation of the Brady Instruction
In recent years, a few legal scholars and jurists have proposed greater
use of adverse inference instructions to sanction discovery misconduct in
both civil and criminal cases.142
One instruction specifically designed to address Brady violations
would inform the jury as follows:
[i]n this case, the government failed to turn over promptly, as required by law, a piece
of evidence favorable to the defense, namely [evidence], of which the defense learned
only on [date], when [means of disclosure]. Although this delay does not necessarily
bear on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, you may, if you think it appropriate in
light of all the evidence, take into account the possible harm to the defense caused by
this delay when evaluating whether the government has proven the defendant’s guilt
143
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The strength of this instruction is in the clarity with which it conveys
the government’s disclosure duty and its breach of that duty. Both of those
components are essential for a jury to appreciate fully the significance of
the government’s Brady violation. The weakness of this instruction,
however, is that it does not go far enough. The instruction fails to inform
the jury that the government’s misconduct was intentional and not the result
of an innocent or careless oversight. This fact underscores the significance
of the government’s misconduct. Also, the instruction directs the jury to
gauge the possible harm or prejudice to the defense caused by the
withholding of the evidence. However, in finding that the government
violated Brady, the trial judge necessarily would have made that
determination in finding that the withheld evidence met the Brady
materiality requirement. Thus, allowing the jury to assess whether the
defense was prejudiced by the Brady violation is misdirected. The
142

Elizabeth N. Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450,
1459 (2006); see also TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 35, at 26-27
(recommending the use of a jury instruction sanction for Brady violations); Imwinkleried,
supra note 119, at 793-96 (advocating for broader use of litigating discovery violations at
trial as a sanction for discovery misconduct by litigants).
143
Dewar, supra note 142, at 1457. Brady instructions have also been proposed by other
legal scholars. See, e.g., 3 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & WILLIAM C. LEE,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 104.27 (5th ed. 2000) (“If you should find that
a party willfully [suppressed] [hid] [destroyed] evidence in order to prevent its being
presented in this trial, you may consider such [suppression] [hiding] [destruction] in
determining what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case.”); 4 THOM
LUNDY, THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMPENDIUM § 36.1.2 (2008),
available at http://www.juryinstruction.com/toc.shtml (password and paid registration
required) (“If you find that the [government] attempted to suppress evidence in any manner,
you may draw an adverse inference to the prosecution. Such an adverse inference may be
sufficient, alone or in combination with other matters, for you to have a reasonable doubt as
to defendant’s guilt.”).
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language of this instruction simply lacks the power to serve as an effective
sanction that will deter Brady misconduct.
A more appropriate Brady instruction would focus the jury’s attention
on what weight, if any, it might choose to give the government’s conduct in
its determination of whether the government has proven guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. A jury should be told, plainly and clearly, that the
government’s intentional nondisclosure of favorable evidence was wrong.
A jury should also be told that it may draw a permissive inference regarding
the connection between the government’s misconduct and whether the
government has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The language of
the Brady instruction should deter prosecutors from withholding Brady
evidence in order to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation. Under the
current state of the law, prosecutors can perform their own private costbenefit analysis to determine whether suppression of Brady evidence is
“worth the risk” of any sanctions. This cost-benefit calculation is greatly
informed by the improbability that the suppressed evidence will ever be
discovered, the remote possibility that there will be any adverse
consequences to the government’s case, and the unlikely prospect that the
individual prosecutor will be held accountable. The prosecutor is forced to
make a very different calculation, however, if a presumptive consequence
of intentional Brady misconduct is an instruction to the jury that places the
government in a disadvantageous position, shifting the tactical advantage of
nondisclosure to the defense. The threat of such a sanction would make the
suppression of evidence a far riskier proposition and would cause
prosecutors to correctly err on the side of disclosure.144 A punitive Brady
instruction that comprehensively addresses all of these concerns would be
the following:
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Under the United States Constitution, in order for the defendant to receive a fair trial,
the government is required to inform the defense of any information known to the
government that tends to suggest the defendant might not have committed the crime(s)
charged as well as information that casts doubt on the credibility of the government’s
own evidence. In this case, the government intentionally withheld such evidence from
the defense. Specifically, the government failed to inform the defense that [ ]. In
evaluating the merits of this case, you can decide what weight, if any, to give to the
government’s misconduct. The government’s actions, standing alone, or in
combination with other facts presented in this case, may create a reasonable doubt in
your mind about the defendant’s guilt.
144

Dewar, supra note 142, at 1462-65 (stating that “the very existence of the [jury
instruction] remedy would cause prosecutors to take more care in carrying out their Brady
duties out of heightened fear of imperiling their convictions” and that “if prosecutors do
suffer lost convictions, jury nullification, or public outcry, [they may be provoked to
improve the delivery of Brady information]”).
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This proposed instruction explains what is required under Brady and
why disclosure is important (and not a mere “technicality”). This
instruction also explains exactly what the government did wrong and
appropriately allows the jury to decide the significance of the misconduct.
While this instruction will not be outcome determinative in every case (nor
should it be), the instruction will likely have a greater impact if the jury
finds that the Brady evidence is central to the guilt/innocence
determination. Conversely, the Brady instruction will have less impact if
the jury believes the government, notwithstanding the Brady violation, has
presented compelling evidence of guilt.
2. The Limitations of the “Brady Instruction” Sanction
The Brady instruction sanction is not a panacea for all Brady
violations. Even if the court finds that the prosecutor intentionally
suppressed material exculpatory or impeachment evidence, the trial court’s
decision to impose this particular sanction is completely discretionary.145
Without a statute or court rule, the defense would not have a right to a
Brady instruction as a remedy. Moreover, the Brady instruction would only
be as effective as the language used by the court to convey the severity of
the violation and explain the nexus between the government’s misconduct
and the burden of proof. The exact language of jury instructions is
generally left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.146 The court could,
therefore, adopt a very weak instruction that would have little impact on the
jury and no deterrent effect upon prosecutors.147
145

33 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 77:272 (West 2009) (stating that the trial judge has
discretion as to the style, form, and language of jury instructions, and the judge’s
formulation of the instructions will be reversed only upon a showing of prejudice); AM. JUR.
TRIAL § 921 (West 2007) (noting that trial judges make the decision whether to give a jury
instruction and which instruction to give, and such decisions may not be overturned absent
an abuse of discretion); see, e.g., State Farm Fire & Gas. Co. v. Short, 459 N.W.2d 111
(Minn. 1990) (noting that trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining jury
instructions).
146
See 33 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 145, § 77:272 (noting that while the parties
are entitled to jury instructions which reflect correct legal standards, they are not entitled to
instructions phrased exactly as they desire); see also John G. Danielson, Inc. v. WinchesterConant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that jury instruction could be
overturned only if a party’s substantial rights are prejudiced, and the instruction misleads the
jury or misstates the correct legal standard).
147
The efficacy of using adverse inference instructions to punish and deter discovery
misconduct has drawn criticism from some legal scholars. Nance, supra note 114, at 1.
Recently, Professor Nance has urged the complete elimination of adverse inference
instructions in most cases. Professor Nance contends that reliance on adverse inference
instructions is misplaced, because it is the role of the court—not the jury—to manage
evidence, set discovery standards for litigants, and apply discipline when there are discovery
abuses by litigants. Nance argues that what jurors actually do when given an adverse
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On balance, the use of a stern, carefully crafted Brady instruction
could simultaneously address the harms occasioned by intentional Brady
misconduct and provide the desired benefits of a Brady sanction, including
the amelioration of the harm suffered by the defendant, vindication of the
integrity of the court, and deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct.
IV. INTENTIONAL BRADY MISCONDUCT AND THE “CONSCIOUSNESS OF A
WEAK CASE” INFERENCE
Independent of the trial judge’s decision to impose a strongly worded
Brady instruction as a sanction for Brady misconduct, evidence of
intentional Brady misconduct is admissible at trial to show that the
government’s case is weak.148 Under well-established principles of
evidence, the government’s intentional suppression of evidence gives rise to
an inference that the prosecutor engaged in obstructionist misconduct,
because she knew that the government’s case was weak and would be
further weakened by the presentation of the Brady evidence at trial. That
subjective assessment by the trial prosecutor—the person in the best
possible position to know the merits of the government’s evidence—
permits the inference that the government’s case is, in fact, weak.149 Given
that the government has the burden of proof in a criminal case and must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence that the government’s case
is weak is relevant to whether the government can meet its burden.
Moreover, the fact that the Brady evidence was eventually disclosed to the
defense and made available for use at trial does not diminish the evidentiary
value of the government’s conduct in withholding critical evidence.
inference instruction is decide whether the litigant’s discovery misconduct warrants
“increasing the burden of persuasion” to the point where the litigant loses. While Professor
Nance correctly identifies some of the weaknesses of adverse inference instructions, these
concerns must yield in the face of intentional Brady misconduct that poses a far greater
threat to the integrity of the adjudication process and results in the wrongful conviction of
innocent people.
148
In Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009), discussed in greater detail in
Part IV, infra, the court noted the distinction between the admission of Brady misconduct as
a sanction for a Brady violation and the presentation of Brady misconduct as “substantive
evidence” that the government’s case is weak. Id. at 11 n.15.
149
Singh v. Prunty, 142 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The prosecutor, more than
neutral jurists, can better perceive the weakness of the state’s case.”); United States v. Boyd,
55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If the prosecutors did not think their case air tight (and so
they tried to improperly bolster it), this is some indication that it was indeed not airtight.”);
see also United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
prosecutor’s bad faith in suppressing Brady evidence “could shed some light on whether the
prosecution thought the evidence was valuable to the defendants”); United States v. Jackson,
780 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1986) (“We are doubtful that any prosecutor would in bad
faith act to suppress evidence unless he or she believed it could affect the outcome of the
trial.”).
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To fully appreciate the evidentiary significance of Brady misconduct
evidence, one need only look at a criminal case from the perspective of the
prosecutor who believes the government has strong evidence of guilt and
can prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor
who is confident that the government will prevail at trial has no incentive to
withhold Brady evidence in violation of the constitutionally mandated
disclosure duty. Instead, upon learning of the Brady evidence, the
prosecutor would disclose the evidence to the defense and use the
considerable investigative resources of the police department, the forensic
skill and technology of the crime lab, and the subpoena power of the grand
jury to refute the Brady evidence at trial.150 The prosecutor who knows the
government’s case is strong and strives to “do justice” and not merely “seek
convictions” is well-positioned to thoroughly investigate the Brady
evidence and eliminate any lingering doubts about the defendant’s
innocence.
By contrast, the prosecutor who believes that the government’s case is
weak has a powerful incentive to withhold Brady evidence to ensure victory
at trial. If the prosecutor has accurately evaluated the merits of the
government’s case and determined that the government does not have
compelling evidence of guilt, the Brady evidence presents a serious
impediment to securing a conviction. The intentional nondisclosure of
Brady evidence, therefore, is an attempt to engineer a guilty verdict in a
weak case by concealing evidence that would, by definition, significantly
bolster the defense case or seriously undermine the government’s case.151
While there may be other reasons for the nondisclosure of Brady evidence,
the defense has a right to present the evidence of Brady misconduct at trial
in support of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference. In rebuttal, the
government can present evidence to support an alternative explanation for
its conduct.152

150

See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 n.9, 480 (1973) (noting that the “virtually
limitless resources of government investigators” give the government “inherent information
gathering advantages,” including the power to interrogate, obtain search warrants, and issue
subpoenas to the grand jury); see also Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1182-83 (1960) (stating that
the state has far superior resources, whereas the defendant has “neither a crime laboratory
nor vast identification and fingerprint files available to him”).
151
Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241 (stating that a Brady violation may support an inference that
“the prosecutors resorted to improper tactics because they were justifiably fearful that
without such tactics the defendants might be acquitted”); see also Conley v. United States,
415 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2005).
152
See infra note 193 (discussing cases regarding a party’s right to present evidence to
rebut the “consciousness of a weak case” inference).
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Accordingly, when the government intentionally withholds Brady
evidence, the defense is entitled to present the facts surrounding the
government’s Brady misconduct at trial and receive the full evidentiary
benefit of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference, including
presentation of facts related to the government’s awareness of the Brady
evidence and the measures taken by the government to prevent its
disclosure to the defense.
In the few cases that have addressed the admissibility of Brady
misconduct evidence at trial in support of the “consciousness of a weak
case” inference, trial judges have used the rules of evidence to exclude
Brady misconduct evidence on the grounds that the evidence was not
relevant153 or was unfairly prejudicial.154 As discussed below, such rulings
are incorrect. Evidence of intentional Brady misconduct meets the
evidentiary standards of admissibility, and the blanket exclusion of such
evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.
A. THE RELEVANCE OF BRADY MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE

Relevance is the starting point for determining the admissibility of a
proffered piece of evidence. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant
evidence is any evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”155
Evidence of Brady misconduct meets the standard of relevance. As John
Henry Wigmore stated:
[i]t has always been understood—the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in
human experience—that a party’s falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and
presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or
spoliation, and all similar conduct is receivable against him as an indication of his
consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness
may be inferred the fact itself of the cause’s lack of truth and merit. The inference
153
See, e.g., United States v. Shelton, 983 A.2d 363, 368 (D.C. 2009) (sustaining
prosecutor’s relevance objection to the admissibility of evidence that Brady material was
intentionally suppressed by the government prior to trial) (discussed infra at notes 211-225
and accompanying text); Barnes v. State, 462 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. App. 1985) (upholding
trial court’s ruling that defense evidence of the prosecutor’s attempts to intimidate defense
witnesses was not admissible to show “the state’s lack of confidence in the strength of its
case” because such evidence was not relevant to the defendant’s guilt and the witness was
not actually intimidated into recanting his testimony).
154
See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defense
contention that law enforcement officers’ conduct in trying to intimidate defense witnesses
was admissible to show the weakness of the government’s case, and finding that evidence
was properly excluded as unfairly prejudicial because, inter alia, the evidence would divert
the jury’s attention to a collateral issue).
155
FED. R. EVID. 401.
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thus does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, but operates,
indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his
156
cause.

Other scholars characterize the “consciousness of a weak case” inference as
a party’s “admission by conduct.” According to McCormick:
[a]s might be expected, wrongdoing by the party in connection with its case
amounting to an obstruction of justice is also commonly regarded as an admission by
conduct. By resorting to wrongful devices, the party is said to provide a basis for
believing that he or she thinks the case is weak and not to be won by fair means, or in
157
criminal cases that the accused is conscious of guilt.

The “consciousness of a weak case” inference recognizes that certain
behavior by a litigant bespeaks a subjective awareness of legal liability. If a
litigant is aware that his case has no merit and is not likely to succeed at
trial, the self-preservation instinct will cause him to take actions that one
would expect of a person seeking to avoid the adverse consequences of
litigation. In civil cases, the “consciousness of a weak case” inference has
been applied to a wide array of misconduct, including the destruction and
suppression of evidence.158 The inference has also been applied against
governmental entities in civil litigation.159
156

JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 2 EVIDENCE § 278, at 133 (James Harmon Chadborn ed.,
Little, Brown 1979) (1940) (emphasis added); see also 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 535 (2008)
(collecting cases on the consciousness of a weak case inference that flows from suppression,
alteration, or fabrication of evidence); Evidence—Admissibility of Attempts by a Party to
Suppress Evidence, 9 TEX. L. REV. 79, 100 (1930) (stating that it has “long been recognized”
that a party’s misconduct in manipulating evidence is admissible as indicating a
“consciousness of the weakness of his case,’” and citing cases from the 1800s that applied
the inference to the fabrication, suppression, or destruction of evidence).
157
2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 203 (John William Strong, ed., 1999). See
generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Party Admissions in Criminal Cases: Should the Government
Have to Eat Its Words?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 401, 402 (2002) (discussing the admissibility of
pretrial statements made by the prosecutor or members of the prosecution team that are
inconsistent with the government evidence at trial as admissions by party opponent).
158
E.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Horab, 309 F.2d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1962) (recognizing
that a litigant’s attempt to prevent service of subpoena on a witness could support the
consciousness of a weak case inference); Scrivner v. Am. Car & Foundry, 50 S.W.2d 1001,
1016 (Mo. 1932) (considering an attempt to bribe a witness to be “an admission,
circumstantial in its nature, that the plaintiff at the time of this offer was conscious of the
weakness of his cause.”); see also Nowack v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 60 N.E. 32 (N.Y. 1901).
See generally Michael J. Hunter, 2004-2005 Evidence, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1075, 1095-96
(2004) (discussing the use of the consciousness of a weak case inference in New York civil
cases).
159
E.g., District of Columbia v. Perez, 694 A.2d 882 (D.C. 1997) (noting that the
alteration of medical records following patient’s death gave rise to the consciousness of a
weak case inference and permitted the jury to resolve factual issues against the government);
Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761, 768 (Md. App. 1985) (stating that the county
government’s action in altering evidence to conceal a defect “may be taken as an indication
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In criminal cases, the “consciousness of a weak case” inference is
almost exclusively used by the government to show that the defendant has a
“guilty mind” or as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.
Evidence of a criminal defendant’s consciousness of guilt has been so
widely accepted that admissibility is regarded as “universally conceded.”160
Such evidence generally falls into two categories. The first category
includes actions taken by the defendant after the crime to elude capture,
such as flight from the scene of the crime, escape from custody, alteration
of physical appearance, use of an alias, and false exculpatory statements to
the police.161 The second category of consciousness of guilt evidence
involves various acts of evidence manipulation by the defendant that are
closely analogous to actions that would constitute Brady misconduct,
including the subornation of perjury, bribery or attempted bribery of
witnesses,162 or the destruction or concealment of incriminating evidence.163
While it is “universally conceded” that the defendant’s conduct in
manipulating and suppressing evidence is admissible to establish the
defendant’s consciousness of guilt, there are a very few criminal cases
applying the “consciousness of a weak case” inference to similar acts of
of consciousness of the weakness of the county’s case and a belief that its defense would not
prevail without the aid of such improper tactics”).
160
WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 276 at 122 (“It is universally conceded today that the
fact of an accused flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption
of a false name and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt,
and thus guilt itself.”).
161
Id.
162
See, e.g., State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024, 1041-44 (Conn. 2003) (writing a letter
offering money in exchange for an alibi); People v. Leyra, 134 N.E.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. 1956)
(offering a false alibi); State v. Melson, 56 P.2d 710, 711 (Wash. 1936) (attempting to pay
witness $500 to withdraw allegation).
163
See, e.g., United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1497-98 (7th Cir. 1990) (allowing
government to introduce the fact that defendant attempted to conceal evidence by shoving it
into his sock as consciousness of guilt); United States ex rel. Foster v. DeRobertis, 741 F.2d
1007, 1014 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that defendant’s concealment of the body in a murder
case supports a consciousness of guilt inference that defendant was responsible for death of
the deceased); State v. Denis, 622 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming the trial
court’s decision to admit a torn check, even though it served as evidence of another crime,
because it showed that defendant had attempted to destroy evidence, demonstrating
consciousness of guilt); State v. Broadhurst, 196 P.2d 407, 430 (Or. 1948) (finding that
repeated incidents of defendant’s fabrication, suppression, and destruction of evidence in a
murder case were admissible as circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt). See generally
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1017 (2008) (collecting cases on circumstantial evidence of
consciousness of guilt based on the suppression, destruction, or fabrication of evidence); Dan
Stigall, Prosecuting Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal Look at “Consciousness of Guilt”
Evidence, 2005 ARMY LAW. 54 (stating that the admissibility of evidence of the destruction
and concealment of incriminating evidence by the defense has long been and continues to be
competent evidence in both federal and military courts).
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evidence suppression by the government in violation of Brady. In preBrady cases, courts acknowledged that government actions amounting to
evidence obstruction are admissible to support the “consciousness of a
weak case” inference. In United States v. Remington,164 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the defense was entitled to adduce evidence at
trial that the prosecutor called witnesses before the grand jury in an effort to
intimidate them. While the court rejected the defense contention that the
witnesses’ testimony should be stricken, the court stated that the evidence
of witness intimidation by the government could properly be explored by
the defense on cross-examination and “brought out as part of the defense
evidence which goes to the jury.”165 The court reasoned that such evidence,
if proven, would constitute “affirmative evidence of the weakness of the
prosecution’s case.”166
Similarly, in United States v. Graham,167 a government witness
testified that his testimony at prior trials was false and induced by promises
of executive clemency by government agents. The court acknowledged that
if such evidence of government misconduct was believed, “the jury would
have had reason enough for concluding that the prosecutor was conscious
that his case against appellants was lacking in merit and that they were
innocent men unjustly accused.”168 The court further stated that the same
presumption that arises against a party who withholds or destroys evidence
“is equally applicable to the prosecution of a criminal charge.”169
Although both Remington and Graham were decided well before the
Court’s decision in Brady, the prosecutor’s misconduct in both cases fall
squarely within the scope of the Brady disclosure duty.170 Post-Brady,
however, there are few cases regarding the use of Brady misconduct
evidence at trial to support the “consciousness of a weak case” inference.171
164

191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 251 (citing WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 278).
166
Id.
167
102 F.2d 436 (2d. Cir. 1939).
168
Id. at 442.
169
Id. at 442-43; see also Commonwealth v. Enwright, 156 N.E. 65, 67 (Mass. 1927)
(“[I]f the district attorney should unfairly suppress evidence he would thereby subject the
case of the commonwealth to the same adverse inferences as would result from similar
conduct by another party to the same cause.”).
170
See supra notes 46 and 48 (citing cases finding Brady violations based on witness
coercion and the presentation of false testimony).
171
E.g., Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009) (discussed infra Part V);
United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d
35, 36-37 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 996-97 (D.C. 1992)
(citing WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 278, and stating that “the persuasive force of the entire
prosecution case might have been impaired or undermined if exculpatory evidence had been
presented at trial.”).
165
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In a handful of cases, courts have found that the prosecutor’s intentional or
bad faith suppression of Brady evidence gave rise to an inference that the
suppressed evidence was material. In Silva v. Brown,172 the government
made a plea deal with its star witness in exchange for testimony against the
defendant. As part of the plea, the witness was required to refrain from
undergoing psychiatric treatment for his mental condition prior to testifying
in the case. The court found that this deal evinced the prosecution’s
concerns regarding the mental state of the witness and should have been
disclosed to the defense as impeachment under Brady. The court found that
the fact that the government went to such extremes showed that even the
prosecution viewed the witness’ testimony “with some doubt.”173
Significantly, the court noted that “the prosecutor’s own conduct in keeping
the deal secret underscores the deal’s importance.”174 In rejecting the
government’s contention that its nondisclosure of the secret deal did not
meet the Brady materiality standard, the court stated that “[t]he Prosecutor’s
actions can speak as loud as his words.”175 The court reasoned that “the
State’s deliberate and strategic decision to make the deal and not to disclose
it suggests the weakness of its post hoc claims that the evidence was
irrelevant.”176
Like the court in Silva, other courts have found that the intentional
nature of the prosecutor’s actions in suppressing Brady evidence gives rise
to an inference that the prosecutor believed the suppressed evidence was
critically important in the case and met the Brady materiality standard.177
Thus, despite the limited precedent and the scarcity of scholarly debate,178
the “consciousness of a weak case” and the “materiality” inferences that
courts have found to flow from the intentional nondisclosure of evidence by
the government provide a solid foundation for finding that Brady
misconduct evidence is relevant to support the “consciousness of a weak
case” inference. This inference is operable against plaintiffs and defendants
in civil cases, against defendants in criminal cases, and against the
government in civil cases. To find that evidence of Brady misconduct is
172

416 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 986.
174
Id. at 990.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
E.g., United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1986).
178
Several legal scholars have written extensively on the scope and limitations of
discovery misconduct evidence. See Nance, supra note 114; Imwinkelreid, supra note 119;
John H. Mansfield, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV.
695 (1992). However, their work has focused exclusively on civil cases and has not
addressed the unique issues that arise in the context of Brady violations in criminal litigation.
173
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not relevant when offered against the government in a criminal case would
create a solitary exception to the general admissibility of a litigant’s
intentional destruction of evidence in support of the “consciousness of a
weak case” inference.
In addition to the relevance of Brady misconduct evidence in support
of a “consciousness of a weak case” inference, Brady misconduct evidence
has particular relevance in cases in which the defense either mounts a
challenge to the government’s criminal investigation or claims the
prosecution is tainted by government misconduct or bias. It is not
uncommon in criminal litigation for the defense to elicit facts to illustrate
that the government did not perform a thorough investigation of the crime.
In Kyles, the Supreme Court noted that an attack by the defense on the
thoroughness of the government’s investigation is a proper subject of
inquiry at trial.179 In furtherance of this defense theory, defense attorneys
commonly seek to show that the police officers handling the investigation
failed to perform critical investigative tasks that could have yielded
exculpatory physical evidence or that might have affirmatively identified
another person as the perpetrator of the crime.180 As the Court noted in
Kyles, “indications of conscientious police work will enhance probative
force [of evidence] and slovenly work will diminish it.”181 Evidence that
the government intentionally withheld Brady material can significantly
bolster the defense theory that the government’s case is not built on the
solid foundation of a conscientious investigation. This defense strategy is
often viewed as the desperate act of a guilty person attempting to escape
responsibility by “putting the government on trial.” But evidence of
179

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995); see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d
593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 399 N.E.2d 482, 486 (Mass. 1980)
(“The fact that certain tests were not conducted or certain police procedures not followed
could raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt in the minds of the jurors.”);
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Mass. 1979) (failure of government
experts to perform state-of-the-art forensic tests admissible); Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620,
628-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (failure to use audio and video equipment to document
key information); People v. Marchese, 638 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. App. Div 1996) (discussing
cross examination of police officers concerning their failure to use available investigative
techniques); Workman v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 368, 378 (Va. 2006) (finding
nondisclosure of favorable evidence violated Brady where evidence could have been used to
“attack the reliability of the police investigation”).
180
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 322-23 (2006) (noting that the defense
criticized the procedures used in the collection and handling of fingerprint, fiber, and DNA
evidence in support of the claim that law enforcement mishandled the investigation). See
generally, 1 DAVID E. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND
COMMENTARY 2-196-200 (3d ed. 2009) (citing Maryland law for the proposition that the
defense is entitled to comment on the absence of well-known and commonly available
evidence like fingerprints).
181
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446 n.15.
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intentional Brady misconduct significantly bolsters the credibility of this
defense theory because the jury learns that the government intentionally
concealed exculpatory evidence and went to great lengths to keep the
evidence hidden in violation of its disclosure duty. This kind of purposeful
misconduct lends credence to defense claims that the government might
have “cut corners” or engaged in other acts of misconduct in the
investigation and preparation of the case.
Likewise, Brady misconduct evidence is particularly relevant in cases
in which the defense contends that the government’s case is based, in whole
or in part, on bias or other improper misconduct by members of the
prosecution team. Defenses grounded in wrongful government conduct
include claims that the police fabricated or planted evidence or that law
enforcement officers plotted to “frame” or falsely implicate the
defendant.182 Also included in this category is the defense of entrapment,183
claims of selective or discriminatory prosecution,184 and retaliatory or
vindictive prosecution claims.185 Evidence of Brady misconduct makes it
more probable that these other forms of misconduct occurred in the case.
Frequently, when the defendant or a witness alleges coercion or
intimidation by police, there are no other witnesses to the event and the jury
is presented with a credibility contest between the defendant and the police
182

See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 322-23 (noting that a major part of the defendant’s defense
was that contaminated and planted evidence was used by law enforcement officers to
purposely frame him for a crime that was actually committed by a third party).
183
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1957) (concluding that the defense of
entrapment is viable when “the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party
and beguiles him into committing crimes which it otherwise would not have attempted”);
United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 908 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that entrapment is a
defense designed to prevent the conviction of the unwary innocent induced by government
action to commit a crime and consists primarily of two elements: actions constituting
inducement by the government and the absence of facts showing criminal predisposition of
the defendant) (citing United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir.1992)). See
generally LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.8, at 501-21 (4th ed. 2003).
184
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (finding that claims of
selective prosecution are grounded in the Equal Protection Clause and require the claimant to
show: (1) that he was singled-out for prosecution while others similarly-situated where not
prosecuted; and (2) the defendant was targeted for prosecution based on race, religion or
some other impermissible basis); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998) (critiquing Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456).
185
Vindictive prosecution claims are rooted in the Due Process Clause and prohibit a
prosecution initiated in retaliation for the defendant exercising a protected constitutional or
statutory right. See United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is an
elementary violation of due process for a prosecutor to engage in conduct detrimental to a
criminal defendant for the vindictive purpose of penalizing the defendant for exercising his
constitutional right at trial.”). Proof of vindictiveness requires some showing that the
prosecutor harbored genuine animus towards the defendant. United States v. Cyprian, 23
F.3d 1189, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
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officer. Informing the jury of the government’s Brady misconduct makes
the defendant’s other allegations of improper conduct more credible.
B. POTENTIAL EXCLUSION OF BRADY MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE AS
“UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL”

Even if a trial judge finds that Brady misconduct evidence is relevant
under the evidentiary rules, the court can still exclude the evidence upon
finding that it is unfairly prejudicial or would cause an unreasonable
disruption in the trial. Specifically, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”186
In applying the probative/prejudicial analysis, trial courts are cautioned
to “distinguish between prejudice resulting from the reasonable persuasive
force of evidence and prejudice resulting from excessive emotional or
irrational effects that could distort the accuracy and integrity of the
factfinding process.”187 In Old Chief v. United States, the Court stated that
unfair prejudice means “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”188
Accordingly, state and federal courts commonly exercise their discretionary
authority to exclude evidence that “evokes the anger or punitive impulses of
the jury, unfairly puts a party or witness in a negative light, appeals to the
jury’s prejudices, or gives rise to overly strong sympathetic reactions.”189
Applying the unfair prejudice standard to Brady misconduct evidence,
a trial judge could exclude facts related to the government’s intentional
Brady misconduct upon finding that the evidence will distract the jury from
its main focus of determining whether the defendant committed the
crime.190 A trial court could find that any probative value of evidence that
the government intentionally concealed favorable information from the
186

FED. R. EVID. 403.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 175 (3d ed. 2003).
188
519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
189
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 187, at 175-80.
190
United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d 35, 36-37 (5th Cir. 1982). The defense argued that an
effort by the government to influence testimony should be considered by the jury in
evaluating the merits of the government’s case, and “an inference may be drawn as to the
weakness of the Government’s case from that conduct.” Id. at 36. The court excluded the
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 finding the evidence was both collateral and
cumulative. Id. at 37; see also Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 136
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (reasoning that informing jury of discovery misconduct may consume jury’s
attention and divert them away from substantive issues in the case).
187
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defense is far outweighed by the risk that jurors might seek to “punish” the
government and express its moral outrage over the government’s
misconduct by rendering a verdict favorable to the defense and against the
weight of the evidence. The potential for this kind of emotionally charged
jury nullification is the kind of unfair prejudice that Rule 403 is designed to
prevent.
In addition to the impact on the prosecution’s case, Brady misconduct
evidence could be excluded by the trial judge on the grounds that such
evidence will unduly extend and complicate the trial, counter to the interests
in judicial economy and efficiency embodied in Rule 403. Litigating the
Brady misconduct issue would involve the presentation of evidence
regarding when the prosecutor learned of the misconduct, who was
involved in the “cover-up,” and the steps the prosecutors took to conceal the
information. In rebuttal, the prosecution would be entitled to present
evidence to show that the nondisclosure of Brady evidence was not in bad
faith, but was the result of carelessness or simple negligence during the
pretrial case preparation, or the innocent failure of the prosecution team to
appreciate the exculpatory nature of the evidence. Presentation of all of
these facts could create a collateral “mini-trial” involving the direct and
cross-examination of numerous additional witnesses and hours of additional
court time. Accordingly, a trial judge could use Rule 403 to exclude the
Brady misconduct evidence based on “considerations of undue delay.”
Despite these concerns and the broad discretionary authority of the
trial court, evidence of intentional Brady misconduct should not be
excluded under Rule 403. As one court has noted, “[t]he fact that
materially exculpatory evidence may complicate a trial is no grounds to
exclude the evidence; some trials are meant to be complicated and juries are
capable of dealing with factual complexity.” 191
Moreover, despite the prejudice to the defense, courts routinely allow
evidence of consciousness of guilt. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court
observed that
there are so many reasons for [consciousness of guilt] conduct, consistent with
innocence, that it scarcely comes up to the standard of evidence tending to establish
guilt; but this evidence has been allowed upon the theory that the jury will give it such
192
weight as it deserves, depending upon the surrounding circumstances.

191

Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 122 (D.C. 1996).
Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 417 (1896) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
192
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Accordingly, consciousness of guilt evidence is freely admitted regardless
of whether the defendant has an innocent explanation for the conduct.193
The defense is simply allowed, in rebuttal, to offer evidence in support of
an innocent explanation of the defendant’s conduct.194 Any prejudice to the
defense is deemed sufficiently mitigated by the court giving the jury a
balanced instruction on the limited value of the evidence in proving guilt
and telling the jury that there may be innocent explanations for the
defendant’s conduct. One standard instruction informs the jury as follows:
[y]ou have heard evidence suggesting that the defendant may have intentionally tried
to conceal evidence in this case. If the Commonwealth has proved that the defendant
did conceal evidence, you may consider whether such actions indicate feelings of guilt
by the defendant and whether, in turn, such feelings of guilt might tend to show actual
guilt . . . . You are not required to draw such inferences, and you should not do so
unless they appear to be reasonable in light of all the circumstances of this case. If
you decide that such inferences are reasonable, it will be up to you to decide how
much importance to give them. But you should always remember that there may be
numerous reasons why an innocent person might do such things. Such conduct does
not necessarily reflect feelings of guilt. Please also bear in mind that a person having
feelings of guilt is not necessarily guilty in fact, for such feelings are sometimes found
in innocent people. Finally, remember that, standing alone, such evidence is never
enough by itself to convict a person of a crime. You may not find the defendant guilty
on such evidence alone, but you may consider it in your deliberations, along with all
195
the other evidence.

Likewise, to ameliorate any possible unfair prejudice to the
government when Brady misconduct evidence is presented, the court should
take similar precautionary measures. Specifically, the government should
be permitted to explain why its conduct, though intentional, does not evince
consciousness of a weak case. The jury can then decide what significance,
if any, the government’s Brady misconduct will have in the case. The trial
court can then modify the court’s standard consciousness of guilt
193

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivera, 490 N.E.2d 1160, 1163-64 (Mass. 1986);
Commonwealth v. Sawyer, 452 N.E.2d 1094, 1102-03 (Mass. 1983).
194
WIGMORE, supra note 156, § 276, at 130 (“[T]he accused may always endeavor to
destroy the adverse significance of his conduct by facts which indicate it to be equally or
more consistent with such other hypothesis than that of consciousness of guilt.”); e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Chase, 530 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Mass. 1988) (“The defendant had an
unqualified right to negate the inference of consciousness of guilt by explaining [the facts] to
the jury . . . .”); Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions, Instruction 3.580 n.6
(2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/juryinstructions/criminal/.
195
Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions, supra note 194; see also
AARONSON, supra note 180, § 2.55(B) (quoting a standard jury instruction as stating, in part:
“You are free to ignore any evidence that the defendant [concealed] evidence if you decide
that the conduct was innocent in nature or was not reflective of a consciousness of guilt of
the crime charged”).
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instruction to inform the jury of the proper use of the Brady misconduct
evidence presented by the defense. In advancing the court’s legitimate
concerns over judicial economy and “considerations of undue delay,” the
same skills in courtroom management and discretion used to regulate and
control the orderly and efficient presentation of consciousness of guilt
evidence should inform the court’s handling of Brady misconduct evidence.
Finally, there is no principled reason to shield the government’s
intentional misconduct from the jury. The rules of evidence currently
provide blanket exclusions for certain categories of evidence—settlement
negotiations, plea discussions, subsequent remedial measures—that
advance important social policies.196
There are no similar policy
considerations to justify shielding intentional misconduct by litigants from
disclosure at trial. In fact, existing evidence exclusionary rules do not
exclude evidence of misconduct by a litigant.197 Just as the evidentiary
rules do not provide a shield for either the defendant who seeks to hide
incriminating evidence or other civil and criminal litigants who engage in
obstructionist behavior, the rules should not shield the government’s
intentional Brady misconduct when legitimately offered by the defense to
prove the government’s case is too weak to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

In addition to meeting evidentiary admissibility standards, the right of
a criminal defendant to present evidence of intentional Brady misconduct in
support of the “consciousness of a weak case” inference is firmly grounded
in the constitutional right to present a defense. Although the Constitution
does not expressly state that criminal defendants have a right to present a
196

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (providing that evidence that a party took remedial steps
or “subsequent remedial measures” after an accident to ameliorate the cause of the accident
and prevent further injuries is not admissible to prove liability); FED. R. EVID. 408 (providing
that statements made by parties during the course of settlement negotiations are generally not
admissible at trial to prove liability); FED. R. EVID. 409 (providing that “good Samaritan”
offers to pay medical expenses out of compassion are not admissible to prove liability); FED.
R. EVID. 410 (providing that statements made during plea negotiations are generally
excluded during trial to prove guilt). See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
187, at 231-63.
197
While Federal Rule of Evidence 408 generally excludes offers to compromise and
statements made during settlement negotiations, the rule expressly allows evidence offered
to prove “an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” FED. R. EVID.
408(b); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 187, at 246. Likewise, Federal Rule
of Evidence 410 generally excludes statements made by the defendant during plea
negotiations but does not prohibit the admissibility of certain sworn statements of the
defendant when offered against the defendant “in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false
statement.” FED. R. EVID. 410.
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defense, the Supreme Court has long recognized that criminal courts cannot
deny defendants the opportunity to adduce relevant evidence to either
establish their innocence or challenge the government’s case. The Court
has stated that the constitutional right to present a defense is grounded in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory
Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.198 The right
has been described as “the right to present the defendant’s version of the
facts”199 and the defendant’s basic right to “have the prosecutor’s case
encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’”200
While state and federal rule makers can adopt rules that restrict or exclude
evidence from criminal trials,201 the Court has stated that the defendant’s
right to present a defense is violated when the rigid application of such
evidentiary rules precludes the defense from presenting probative
exculpatory evidence.
In Chambers v. Mississippi,202 hearsay rules and the common law
“voucher rule,” which barred a litigant from impeaching his own witness,
were used to prevent the defense from presenting testimony that a hostile
witness had previously confessed to the very crime the defendant was
charged with committing. The Court found that “where constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanically to defeat the ends of
justice.”203 Similarly, in Crane v. Kentucky,204 the Court found that the
right to present a defense was violated by a state court evidence rule that
prevented the defendant from presenting evidence to show that the police
coerced his confession. In the Court’s most recent pronouncement on the
right to present a defense, Holmes v. South Carolina,205 the Court found
unconstitutional a state court rule that allowed a trial court to bar the
defense from presenting evidence that a third party actually committed the
198

Id. at 690. (“Whether rooted in, Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or
in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment the
Constitution guarantees defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.”) (citations omitted); see also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
§§ 2.1-2.6 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998); Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense:
An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711 (1976).
199
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 423 (1988) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 19 (1967)).
200
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986).
201
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (citing United States v. Scheffer,
523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)).
202
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
203
Id. at 302.
204
Crane, 476 U.S. at 687.
205
Holmes, 547 U.S. 319.
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crime if the trial judge determined that the government had already adduced
strong evidence of guilt.
The Supreme Court has also found that the right to present a defense is
violated by the arbitrary application of state court rules that prevent the
presentation of certain evidence by the defense but impose no
corresponding restriction on the government’s ability to present the same
type of evidence.
In Washington v. Texas,206 the Court found
unconstitutional a Texas statute that barred the defense from presenting the
exculpatory testimony of an accomplice but did not prohibit the accomplice
from giving inculpatory testimony for the prosecution. In finding that this
uneven and arbitrary evidentiary rule violated due process, the Court noted
that the state had no legitimate reason for the double standard. In his
concurrence, Justice Harlan also condemned the Texas evidence rule for its
“discrimination between the prosecution and the defense.”207
The right to present a defense does not, however, give the accused an
unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or
otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. The Court, in
Illinois v. Taylor, stated that “[t]he adversary process could not function
effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly
presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair
opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the
opponent’s case.”208 When the defendant’s right to present exculpatory
evidence conflicts with evidence rules, the court must balance these
competing interests to determine whether those advanced by exclusion of
the evidence must yield to the defendant’s rights. Several provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence recognize this delicate balance and expressly
make exclusionary rules subject to the defendant’s constitutional right to
present a defense.209

206

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Id. at 17 (Harlan, J., concurring).
208
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411 (1988).
209
For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence generally exclude impeachment with
juvenile adjudications but permit its use if required for “a fair determination of the issue of
guilt or innocence.” FED. R. EVID. 609(d). In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974), the
Court held that the state’s interest in protecting juvenile records could not be used to prevent
the defendant from impeaching a key government witness based on bias. The Court
recognized that the state’s interest “must fall before the right of petitioner to seek out the
truth in the process of defending himself.” Id. Likewise, the “rape shield” provision of the
Federal Rules of Evidence generally precludes criminal defendants from introducing
evidence concerning a rape complainant’s sexual history or predisposition but allows such
evidence if “exclusion . . . would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.” FED. R.
EVID. 412(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396 (W.D.N.C. 1991)
(finding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense necessitated the
207
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Against this backdrop, blanket exclusion of Brady misconduct
evidence when offered by the defense to support the “consciousness of a
weak case” inference would violate the defendant’s right to present a
defense. Any rule that would preclude the defendant from offering
evidence of the government’s intentional suppression of evidence while
freely allowing the government to introduce evidence of the defendant’s
acts of evidence suppression to show consciousness of guilt would
constitute the very kind of arbitrary and uneven application of the rules of
evidence struck down by the court in Washington v. Texas over forty years
ago, especially when there are no compelling policy reasons to justify
exclusion of this evidence. 210
In sum, Brady misconduct evidence is admissible under the rules of
evidence because intentional Brady violations give rise to the wellestablished “consciousness of a weak case” inference. Not only is Brady
misconduct evidence relevant to whether the government’s case is strong
enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such evidence is
particularly probative when the defense challenges the integrity of the
government’s investigation and when the defense claims that the
prosecution is tainted by government bias or ill will toward the defendant.
Brady misconduct evidence is also admissible over an “unfair prejudice”
objection. Just as courts have developed safeguards to prevent any unfair
prejudice to the defendant from the admission of consciousness of guilt
evidence, trial judges can use similar measures to prevent Brady
misconduct evidence from causing unfair prejudice to the government’s
case. Finally, prohibiting the defense from presenting evidence of the
government’s intentional acts of evidence suppression would run afoul of
the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, especially when
evidence rules liberally allow the prosecution to present such evidence
against the defense.
V. THE CASE OF ARNELL SHELTON
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals opinion in United States v.
Shelton211 is perhaps the first (and only) post-Brady case to apply the
presentation of evidence of complainant’s previous allegations of sexual misconduct against
three other men).
210
E.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 120 (D.C. 2003) (“The language of the
party admissions rule provides no basis for creating a prosecutorial exception or an
exception where the government is the party opponent. Such an exception . . . is unfair in
light of the applicability of the party admissions rule to criminal defendants.”); People v.
Hall, 12 N.W. 665, 668 (Mich. 1882) (stating that “[t]here is no more reason for exempting
the prosecution than the defence [sic] from scrutiny concerning tampering with witnesses”
where government tried to induce witnesses to suppress testimony).
211
983 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2009).
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“consciousness of a weak case” inference to intentional Brady misconduct.
As discussed in more detail below, Shelton serves as a good vehicle to
illustrate the application of the Brady instruction and the “consciousness of
a weak case” inference.
A. THE FACTS

Arnell Shelton was tried in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia for assault with intent to kill and other charges related to the
shooting of Christopher Boyd.212 According to the government, while Boyd
was double parked in his car, Shelton arrived on the scene in another
vehicle and fired several shots at Boyd, hitting Boyd in his back.
Remarkably, Boyd sped away and drove himself to a nearby hospital. The
identity of the shooter was the central disputed issue at trial. To prove that
Shelton was the shooter, the government relied primarily on Boyd’s
testimony that he knew Shelton before the shooting and recognized Shelton
as the person who shot him. Boyd also testified that Shelton’s possible
motive to shoot him was a prior “beef” between them.213 For the defense,
Shelton’s wife testified that Shelton was at home on the night of the
shooting. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict at the
conclusion of the first trial, and the judge declared a mistrial.214
On the eve of the retrial, Shelton’s defense attorney was contacted by
the new prosecutor assigned to the case who reported that there was
“potential Brady” information that had not been disclosed to the defense.215
Specifically, the new prosecutor disclosed that Officer Woodward, the first
police officer assigned to investigate the shooting, spoke briefly to Boyd at
the hospital before he went in for surgery. Officer Woodward asked Boyd
if he knew the identity of the person who shot him, and Boyd responded in
the negative, stating either that he did not know or did not see who shot
him. Boyd’s hospital statement was memorialized in Officer Woodward’s
notes and in Woodward’s grand jury testimony.216 Despite defense
counsel’s Brady request prior to the first trial, the original trial prosecutor
never informed the defense of Boyd’s hospital statement.

212

Id. at 364.
Prior to the shooting, Boyd testified that he informed his cousin that Shelton had
made unwanted sexual advances towards his cousin’s sister. Boyd testified that he was
present when his cousin confronted Shelton on the street and the retaliatory confrontation led
to his cousin assaulting Shelton and causing major damage to Shelton’s car. Id. at 365-66.
214
Id. at 364 n.6.
215
Transcript of Pretrial Hearing re Brady Disclosure at 13, United States v. Shelton, No.
F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 18, 2002) (on file with author).
216
Id. at 15; Brief for Appellee at 11, Shelton v. United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2007) (on file with author).
213
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Defense counsel informed the trial judge of the new prosecutor’s lastminute disclosure of Brady information and moved to dismiss all charges
with prejudice. The trial judge delayed the start of the trial until the next
day to give the defense an opportunity to investigate the Brady information
and the circumstances surrounding its nondisclosure. The following day,
the prosecutor candidly admitted in court that the original prosecutor (Mr.
Kline) was aware of Boyd’s hospital statement prior to the first trial. When
asked by the trial judge why Mr. Kline failed to disclose the statement to
the defense, the prosecutor stated:
[i]t was Mr. Kline’s position that the information was not exculpatory. . . . My
understanding is that Mr. Kline’s position was based on the thought that there was a
reason for the witness to respond in that way. The reason being that the witness was
in pain. He had just been taken to the hospital. He was on a gurney, staff attending to
217
him, etc.

In response, the trial judge stated:
given the prosecutor’s obligations under Brady v. Maryland, I don’t see how the
prosecutor who states that if a witness says I don’t know who shot me or I did not see
who shot me or all I saw was a dark car, who’s later going to come into court and say
Arnell Shelton shot me, I saw it, saw him, and should not turn that over because the
prosecutor doesn’t think it true. . . . I don’t see how any prosecutor anywhere in any
state in the country could say I don’t have to turn that over because I think I know
218
why he said that.

Thereafter, the trial judge offered (and the defense declined) a
continuance of the trial date and denied the defense motion to dismiss.
During the second trial, Boyd identified Shelton as the shooter, and the
defense then called Officer Woodward to testify to Boyd’s hospital
statement. The defense then attempted to elicit from Officer Woodward the
fact that Boyd’s hospital statement was withheld by the government prior to
the first trial. The government objected on relevance grounds. The court
sustained the objection and stated to defense counsel: “I don’t want you
[going] into what he told Mr. Kline, why Mr. Kline didn’t tell you, the
jury’s not going to hear that.”219 The defense attorney explained that her
purpose in eliciting testimony regarding the Brady violation was to show
that the government was “playing dirty.” The trial judge stated that the sole
remedy for the Brady violation was the offer of a continuance. The judge
informed defense counsel that “there’s no other sanction you’re going to
get.”220

217
218
219
220

Shelton, 983 A.2d at 367.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id.
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At the close of the evidence, Arnell Shelton was convicted on all
counts. Shelton argued on appeal that the trial court erred in precluding the
defense from introducing the facts surrounding the Brady violation to
support a “consciousness of a weak case” inference.221 The appellate court
agreed, holding that “defense counsel had a basis in law to argue that the
government’s nondisclosure of exculpatory information was akin to an
admission by conduct that the government was conscious that its case was
weak (and that it was in fact weak) and that appellant should have been
allowed to present that evidence.”222
B. ANALYSIS

Although the opinion in Shelton should be lauded for its clarity in
articulating the clear nexus between intentional Brady violations and the
“consciousness of a weak case” inference,223 the opinion does not provide
any guidance to trial courts on sanctions to be imposed when confronted
with these kinds of intentional Brady violations. The Brady violation in
Shelton was intentional. The facts clearly indicate that the prosecutor was
well aware of the statement prior to the first trial, and the prosecutor’s
stated belief that disclosure was not required demonstrates that the
withholding of the statement was a deliberate decision.224 Notwithstanding,
no sanction was imposed by the trial court. The only “sanction” the trial
court purported to impose was a continuance of the trial date. This, of
course, was not actually a sanction against the government. Given the
government’s blatant Brady violation, a Brady instruction would have been
an effective and appropriate sanction. Consistent with the instruction
proposed above in Part III, the trial judge could have instructed the jury as
follows:
221

Id. at 369.
Id. at 371.
223
The court in Shelton recognized that the Brady disclosure duty is breached whether
nondisclosure is negligent or intentional but correctly noted that only an intentional
suppression of Brady information will give rise to the inference that the government
considered that disclosure of the evidence would weaken its case. Id. at 372 n.19.
224
Also, contrary to the prosecutor’s dubious contention that he believed Boyd’s
statement was not credible because Boyd was injured and in pain when the statement was
made, these extreme circumstances surrounding the making of the statement would make the
statement more—not less—credible under traditional rules of evidence. As the statement
was made shortly after Boyd was shot and related to the circumstances surrounding the
shooting (the identity of the shooter), the statement would likely be deemed sufficiently
reliable to be admissible as an “excited utterance” under either the federal or the District of
Columbia rules of evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining an excited utterance as “[a]
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition”); Price v. United States, 545 A.2d
1219 (D.C. 1988) (noting the same).
222
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[u]nder the United States Constitution, in order for the defendant to receive a fair trial,
the government is required to inform the defense of any information known to the
government that tends to suggest that the defendant might not have committed the
crime(s) charged, as well as information which casts doubt on the credibility of the
government’s own evidence. In this case, the government intentionally withheld such
evidence from the defense. Specifically, the government failed to inform the defense
that shortly after he was shot, Mr. Boyd informed the police that he could not identify
the person who shot him. In evaluating the merits of this case, you can decide what
weight, if any, to give to the government’s misconduct. The government’s actions,
standing alone, or in combination with other facts presented in this case, may create a
reasonable doubt in your mind about the defendant’s guilt.

In addition, the decision in Shelton fell short in finding that the trial
court’s error in precluding the defense from presenting Brady misconduct
evidence was harmless. The Shelton court failed to fully appreciate the rich
evidentiary value of Brady misconduct evidence and the persuasive force of
the “consciousness of a weak case” inference.225 In the hands of a skilled

225

The government’s evidence of guilt was not overwhelming. There was no gun or
other physical evidence to link Shelton to the crime scene. The entire case rested largely on
the strength of Boyd’s identification of Shelton as the shooter. In support of its conclusion
that Shelton was not prejudiced by the trial court’s error, the Shelton court stated that Officer
Woodward’s testimony regarding the hospital statement was “ambiguous” and “did not have
much force.” Shelton, 983 A.2d at 372. In fact, the only ambiguity was whether Boyd told
Woodward: “I did not see who shot me,” or whether Boyd said: “I don’t know who shot
me.” Under either version, Boyd told Officer Woodward that he could not identify the
shooter. In addition, Officer Woodward—not Boyd—first mentioned Shelton’s name as the
possible shooter when he interviewed Boyd. Id. at 366. Before traveling to the hospital to
interview Boyd, Boyd’s mother told Woodward about the prior beef between Boyd and
Shelton. Brief for Appellee, supra note 216, at 16; Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Shelton v.
United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 3, 2006); see also Transcript of Jury Trial
at 225-30, Shelton v. United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 23, 2002). Even
then Boyd did not name Shelton as the shooter. Id. In addition, Boyd testified that when he
spoke to Woodward he was “in and out of consciousness” and “didn’t really know what was
going on at the time.” Shelton, 983 A.2d at 365. However, Officer Woodward testified that
when he arrived at the hospital to speak to Boyd, though Boyd appeared to be in obvious
pain from his gunshot wound, Boyd was very much conscious, awake, and alert. Transcript
of Jury Trial, supra, at 229. Woodward’s testimony on this point was bolstered by Boyd’s
hospital records (introduced by the defense), which reported that Boyd was alert although
“anxious” and in “moderate pain.” Brief of Appellant supra, at 12; see also Transcript of
Jury Trial at 351, 362, Shelton v. United States, No. F-847-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 24,
2002). The Shelton court also stated that Boyd’s eyewitness identification was corroborated
by another witness, Andrew Durham, who was “not significantly impeached.” Id. at 373.
However, Durham was impeached with two different pretrial statements wherein he stated
that he did not know the shooter. Durham was also impeached with the fact that during a
pretrial meeting with detectives when he was shown a photograph of Shelton, Durham stated
that the photograph did not look anything like the shooter. Transcript of Jury Trial (July 23,
2002), supra, at 208, 168, 196, 205; Brief of Appellant, supra, at 10-12. The defense also
impeached Durham with the fact that he only stated that he could identify Shelton as the
shooter after Durham was incarcerated and facing his own criminal charges. Thus, Boyd’s
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criminal defense attorney, the government’s Brady misconduct could
illuminate the overall weaknesses in the government’s case and explain the
strong connection between the government’s misconduct and the
government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For
example, the defense could have argued the following:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury:
Actions speak louder than words. By their actions—hiding and concealing key
evidence—the government is sending you a message: they cannot prove that Mr.
Shelton committed this crime. Mr. Boyd, the government’s key witness, told the
police that he did not know who shot him and he could not identify the shooter. Plain
and simple: the government’s case is weak. They know it, and now you know it, too.
This case is not about the evidence the government showed you, it’s about the
evidence they tried to hide from you. The evidence they never wanted you to hear.
The prosecution knew you would never believe Mr. Boyd if you knew the that the
story Mr. Boyd is saying now is completely different from what he reported to the
police at the hospital right after he was shot. This is the truth the government tried to
hide. These are the facts they did not want you to know.
Ask yourself: if the government had a solid case against Mr. Shelton, why would they
stoop so low as to violate the law by purposely hiding this critical piece of evidence?
They wouldn’t. They would have no reason to. Hiding evidence is an act of
desperation. The government wants to win at all costs—even if they have to cheat to
do it. By their underhanded actions, the government is telling you that their case is
weak. And we hear them loud and clear.
Ladies and Gentlemen, after all they did and all they hid, how could you not have a
reasonable doubt in this case?

Having admitted on the record that nondisclosure of the hospital
statement was not accidental, the government would have been hardpressed to proffer a credible explanation to rebut the “consciousness of a
weak case” inference argued by the defense. Because the trial court
precluded the Brady misconduct evidence needed to support the
“consciousness of a weak case” inference, the defense in Shelton was
unable to attack the heart of the government’s case and reap the full benefit
of this valuable argument on reasonable doubt.
VI: CONCLUSION
The magnitude of Brady misconduct in the American criminal justice
system is reflected in the number of wrongful convictions, near executions,
and other miscarriages of justice in state and federal courtrooms across the
country. These violations infect the accuracy of the fact-finding process
and undermine the overall integrity of the judicial system. Prosecutors have
identification was not bolstered by other compelling evidence presented by the government
at trial.
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not performed well as the stewards of exculpatory evidence but have
remained steadfast in their resistance to any external restrictions on their
ability to control whether and when Brady evidence is disclosed to the
defense. As both Stevens and Shelton make plain, the status quo is
dysfunctional. In seeking to improve the management and delivery of
Brady evidence, criminal courts should take a serious look at two well-worn
civil practices that allow litigants to introduce discovery misconduct
evidence at trial, either as a court-imposed sanction or as relevant evidence
of the weakness of a litigant’s case. Unlike other Brady reform proposals,
both these measures can be fully implemented by trial courts within the
framework of existing law and could prompt prosecutors to begin
systematically disclosing all material exculpatory evidence to the defense as
envisioned by the Supreme Court over forty-five years ago in Brady v.
Maryland.

